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# No Country for (Migrant) Children? The Great Recession and Multidimensional Disadvantage of Children in Spain(*)

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**Abstract**

Spain has been one of the countries most affected by the global economic crisis, with a huge impact on unemployment, real incomes and economic inequality. This paper analyses to what extent the current recession has affected poverty and social exclusion among children, using different approaches and paying special attention to the gap between migrant and native children. We find that the rise in child poverty has been far more intense than official EU-2020 indicators suggest, especially among children living in low work intensity households and in families paying off a mortgage. Although the relative deterioration has been somewhat larger for native than for migrant children, differences between children and the total population are still mainly driven by higher immigrant child poverty and deprivation rates.

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**Resumen**

España es uno de los países más afectados por la crisis económica, con claros impactos en términos de desempleo, ingresos reales y desigualdad económica. Este trabajo analiza hasta qué punto la actual recesión ha afectado al riesgo de pobreza y exclusión de los niños, empleando distintos enfoques y prestando especial atención a la brecha entre niños inmigrantes y autóctonos. La investigación muestra que el aumento de la pobreza infantil ha sido bastante más intenso de lo que el indicador oficial de riesgo de pobreza o exclusión incluido en la Estrategia Europa-2020 sugiere, especialmente entre los niños que viven en hogares de baja intensidad laboral y en familias que están pagando una hipoteca. Aunque el empeoramiento relativo ha sido algo mayor para los niños nativos que para los inmigrantes, los altos niveles de pobreza y privación de estos últimos siguen explicando casi por completo las diferencias observadas entre los niños y el conjunto de la población.

Spain stands out as being one of the countries most affected by the economic downturn, with huge impacts in terms of real incomes and job losses, especially in the case of youth and immigrant-headed households. Unemployment, low wages, job insecurity and high housing costs have reduced the standard of living of many families which had managed to make ends meet during the previous period of strong economic growth. This deterioration has been especially pronounced for working-class households, but has also affected middle-class families with reduced incomes, dependent children and high rental or mortgage costs. As a result, Spain is currently one of the worst performers among OECD countries in terms of income inequality and financial child poverty.

This trend has important and troubling implications for equity and social cohesion, given the widespread evidence on the link between childhood experiences and adult outcomes. Growing up in an economically disadvantaged household has been shown to have long-lasting effects on children's well-being, educational attainment and health, significantly increasing the risk of poverty and social exclusion in later life (Duncan y Magnusson 2013, Ermisch, Jäntti y Smeeding [eds] 2012, Corak 2006, Duncan and Brooks-Gun [eds.] 1997). In countries with significant immigrant flows, child poverty can also have a negative impact on the long-term success of immigrant integration policies, eroding the economic prospects of the second generation and reducing social cohesion in the long term.

Against this background, this paper looks into the risk of child poverty and social exclusion in Spain in recent years, paying special attention to the crisis's differential effects on immigrant and native families. Taking the official indicator laid down to monitor the poverty reduction objective in the so-called Europe 2020 Strategy as a starting point, the constraints of this measure are discussed and other useful approaches are put forward and

applied to complement the analysis of children's economic position and the gap linked to being of immigrant origin.

The study makes various contributions. On the one hand, it contributes to recent advances in the multidimensional poverty literature by showing how different measures affect the assessment of levels and trends of economic disadvantage. On the other, this paper adds empirical evidence on the gap between immigrant and native families in Spain, a major new pole of immigration in Europe. Furthermore, it also adds evidence on the social consequences of the current economic crisis in a country which has been particularly hard hit, focusing on one of the most vulnerable groups: the children. This aspect is highly relevant in terms of policy in Spain at a time when the government has approved the first plan aimed at combating child poverty, in the midst of a certain debate on how to share out the additional funds (not too generous) among the regions.

The document is structured as follows. First, the background is set out, together with some initial considerations on the relationship between economic crises and child poverty and a description of Spain's economic and institutional context. The paper's objectives and strategy are then described, with an explanation of the definitions and data employed. The third block presents the results obtained. The paper ends with some brief conclusions.

## Background

Several reports by international organisations and independent studies have revealed the special vulnerability suffered by children in a context of economic crisis. Apart from the negative impact on consumption due to a fall in income, it is interesting to note that economic recessions tend to generate losses of families' net wealth as a result of

asset devaluation and an increase in debts, a worse emotional climate in the household leading to more conflicts and domestic violence, and pressures favouring child or teenage labour, depending on the social class and institutional setting (Kalil 2013, Jones, McKay and Espey 2009). Likewise, some studies suggest that crises lead to negative effects in terms of child malnutrition (García-Rada 2013, Taylor-Robinson et al. 2013), academic performance (Steven and Schaller 2011, Pinger 2013) and the general state of health (Karanikolos et al. 2013, Oberg 2011).

Since most children live in households supported by working-age adults, who are highly dependent on wages, it is understandable that economic crises should have significant negative effects on their living conditions. Nonetheless, the magnitude and intensity of such changes depend on factors that may vary according to the context. At an aggregate level, similar amounts of GDP reduction are compatible with very different evolutions in the unemployment rate, as international experience has repeatedly shown. Likewise, the length and distribution of intra-family unemployment can play a significant role, which goes beyond the aggregate unemployment rate (Ayala, Cantó and Rodríguez 2011).

Although some studies suggest that parents' unemployment has in itself negative consequences for the well-being of children (Yoshikawa, Aber and Beardslee 2012), the impact's magnitude clearly depends on the income replacement mechanisms of a public (social transfers) or private (savings, credit, or family help) nature available to families. Changes in the supply of work of household members and a fall in consumption, especially spending on durable goods, are also important reaction mechanisms in the face of adverse shocks suffered by work income (Blundell et al. 2008). The room for manoeuvre households have to adjust housing costs downwards is possibly a decisive element in this scenario, because income after discounting such costs is the disposable income households

really have to meet their children's needs, as emphasized by a 2012 UNICEF report (UNICEF 2012, 9).

The above-mentioned factors can vary significantly from country to country, depending on their socio-economic structure or welfare state model, but also among social groups. In most cases, but not always (Jenkins et al. 2012), the effects of crises tend to be asymmetric, punishing low-income working class families more than high-income households. Newly landed immigrants' position can be particularly weak in this context, due to the disadvantages they encounter in the labour market, worse access to contributory benefits and less protection from previous wealth or family and social networks. And there is some evidence that this is what is happening in the current economic crisis (Collett 2012, Papademetriou et al. 2010, Papademetriou and Terrazas 2009), although the long-term impacts on integration outcomes are yet unknown.

## The Spanish Context

### Global Trends

**The "Marvellous Decade".** Between the mid-nineties and 2007, a period of intense economic growth with average rises in the GDP rate amounting to 3.5% took place in Spain. This period of expansion was exceptional in both historic as well as comparative terms. The period represented an experience that, though not unique (other countries like Ireland underwent even higher growth rates), was certainly outstanding in the European context. During the so-called "marvellous decade" of the Spanish economy, the unemployment rate fell from values of around 20-25% at the beginning of the 1990s to a minimum of 8% in the second quarter of 2007. Consequently, the number of employed

people, which had remained steady at around 12 million since the start of the democratic transition, increased without interruption from the mid-nineties to above twenty million in 2007.

This exceptional period of expansion in Spain was characterised by some features that should be highlighted. The most significant is without doubt the leading role played by the building industry and other labour-intensive sectors needing only poorly qualified workers (such as catering, agriculture and domestic services). The consequence of this bias was that the rise in employment was mainly concentrated in low-productivity jobs with medium-low salaries. This perhaps helps to explain why Spain had such a high in-work at risk-of-poverty rate in 2007 at the peak of the economic boom (it was the fourth highest in the EU-28 after Romania, Greece and Poland), and why economic inequality had not fallen significantly after a decade-long economic miracle.

**The migratory boom.** The decade before the beginning of the economic crisis was also the decade in which one of the most significant migratory booms in recent history took place. In a little over ten years, Spain's population increased by more than five million people due to the arrival of people born abroad, attracted by large job opportunities, accounting for approximately a third of the net immigration received by the European Union in the period. The immigrant population's percentage rose from less than 3% at the end of the 1990s to more than 13% in 2009, thus taking a path other countries had followed over several decades in just a few years. The main countries of origin of these flows were Morocco, Romania, Bulgaria, Ecuador, Colombia and other Latin American countries, along with China.

There is widespread consensus among experts on the key role immigration played in the expansionary period's exceptionally good economic results (Dolado y Vázquez [eds.] 2008, Sebastián 2006). The continuous influx of immigrant workers allowed demand for labour in numerous productive sectors to be filled, providing essential services to families and improved public finance balances. Inevitably, however, it also served to fuel the expansion of an economic model that was barely sustainable in the long term.

**Changes after the Big Recession.** The start of the international economic crisis was aggravated in Spain by the bursting of the real estate bubble (Ruiz-Huerta and De la Rocha 2012). It supposed a radical shift with regard to the preceding scenario, leading to negative GDP growth rates from 2009 and a rise in unemployment to reach 27% in the first quarter of 2013. Job losses were uneven across the population. During the first few years, they affected males more than females, younger people more than older people, immigrants more than native Spaniards and those with lower educational attainment levels more than university graduates. The fall in the employment rate was directly linked to the collapse of the building industry (which had employed more than 20% of immigrants in 2007) and was particularly serious and early among foreign workers, with a reduction from 68% in 2006 to 54% at the end of 2009[1].

Average household income fell in real terms, especially in the lower part of the distribution. A recent OECD study which compares more than thirty nations shows that Spain is the country that experienced the greatest increase in income inequality before and after tax between 2007 and 2011, and the one where disposable income in the lowest decile decreased the most (OECD 2014, 1-2). The at-risk-of poverty rate increased only moderately in overall terms due, among other factors, to the lowering of the poverty

[1] According to the Labour Force Survey (http://www.ine.es/jaxiT3/Tabla.htm?t=4222).

threshold and an improvement in the relative situation of the elderly. However, living conditions worsened significantly for the working-age population and their dependants.

With regard to immigration, the main repercussion of the change in the economic context was the slowing down of entry flows and a stabilisation of the population of foreign origin at around 13% of the total population, along with an increase in departures. It should be underlined, in any event, that the migrant repatriation programmes put into place by the government did not achieved the expected results. This is particularly true in the case of families with young children well integrated into the school system, as well as for households having to continue repaying mortgages for houses which were impossible to sell since the start of the crises (Martí, Serafí and Viruela 2011).

## Institutional Features

**Social structure and social policies.** Spain belongs to a group of European countries characterised by high levels of economic inequality and limited income redistribution through the tax and transfer system. After two decades of a certain improvement in distribution during the 1970s and 1980s, which was related to the implementation of tax and welfare mechanisms already in place in other countries, inequality remained steady in the 1990s until the beginning of the crisis[2]. The expansionary phase led to a significant increase in consumption capacity and absolute living conditions for a growing number of people (the country's total population rose from around 40 million in 1998 to 46 million in 2008), but the gap between rich and poor was not reduced in overall terms.

[2] According to household income surveys. Some recent studies based on different data sources, such as the Family Wealth Survey or fiscal data, suggest that inequality was already increasing in the years prior to the crisis. See among others Arellano and Bover 2013 or Onrubia and Picos 2013.

A significant institutional trait that is important to understand the Spanish context is the weakness of welfare policies aimed at the working-age population, particularly family policies. Unlike other developed countries, Spain does not have any significant welfare benefits targeted at families with children (although there are some child-related fiscal deductions) and the timid efforts to implement child support measures have mostly been cancelled or rolled back during the crisis[3]. Hence, families with children that enter into difficulties due to situations of unemployment or low wages cannot rely on specific social welfare programs, other than a certain adjustment for family burdens in some welfare benefits.

**Migrant integration.** Unlike other countries traditionally open to immigration like Canada or Australia, which have well-defined policies to attract immigrants, Spain has not planned for the entry of foreign nationals since the 1990s. Rather, immigration simply "happened" (Arango 2014, Izquierdo 1996). There was no long-term strategy, but instead a mere attempt at adjusting to the growing and changing "needs" of the economy. As a consequence, the phenomenon's regulation tended to come about with a delay and many times towed by reality, as can be clearly seen in the frequent regularisations carried out at the end of the 1990s and the first few years of the 2000s and the late implementation of integration policies.

Despite this fact, the process of accommodating the immigrant population had mixed results just before the crisis in 2008. Its positive results included high labour force participation rates among immigrant workers and the absence of any significant social conflicts, as well as access to a range of basic rights and social services, which included

[3]The only universal birth/adoption benefit existing in Spain was thus withdrawn after being in force a little over three years, and the amounts of dependent child benefits were cut even more to almost irrelevant amounts (Cantó and Ayala 2014). Furthermore, student grants programmes and textbook and school meal subsidies were reduced in many regions (González-Bueno, Bello and Arias 2012).

access to obligatory education and also healthcare based on *de facto* residence regardless of legal status. This aspect was important in a country where most foreign workers had to go through a period of irregularity before being granted regular work and residence permits, as was also the case in other southern European countries.

Two aspects should be underlined among its negative results. Firstly, the inclusion of foreign nationals into the labour market came about disproportionately through precarious, badly paid, low-quality jobs, which offered almost no chance for professional promotion. These jobs represented a particularly "sticky" floor in Spain and greatly limited upward mobility in the country after arrival, especially in the case of workers from non-EU countries (Aysa-Lastra and Cachón 2013, Simón, Sanromá and Ramos 2014)[4].

Secondly, the period characterised by the greatest influx of migrants was also the time when house prices increased the most, above salaries and the Consumer Price Index. New residents found housing to be one of their main difficulties to settling down in Spain, with a small and expensive rental market, an almost total lack of public housing and a property market fully immersed in a boom (González-Enríquez 2010, 27). As in the case of the United States, many families with insecure jobs and low wages purchased a home with the consent of the banks, thereby taking out mortgage loans which became a significant economic burden after the recession.

The final impact of the economic crisis on the integration trajectories of migrants is yet to be analysed. There is, however, clear evidence of a worsening in living, working and housing conditions in Spain linked to the destruction of many of the jobs they had held during the expansionary phase (Ballester, Velazco and Rigall-i-Torrent 2014, Rinken, Bermúdez-Torres and Cortés-Sánchez 2012, González-Enríquez [coord.] 2010).

[4]In this regard, Spain would represent a model of segmented or downward assimilation rather than the U-shaped pattern (degradation before recovery) suggested by classical assimilation theory. A typical limited upward trajectory would be from irregular work in domestic service or labour-intensive agriculture to a regular job in the building or catering industries.

**Child outcomes.** Over the last few decades, children in Spain have suffered a risk of poverty slightly above the average figure for the country, but which was high in terms of international comparisons. According to Eurostat data, Spain was the country with the second highest child poverty rate in 2012 (nearly 30%), only behind Romania. It also has comparatively high values for the at-risk of poverty or social exclusion indicator included in the Europe 2020 strategy, resulting from the combination of a high risk of monetary poverty and a high unemployment rate. After the increase linked to the crisis, the percentage of children living in low work intensity households in Spain became the third highest after Ireland and Croatia[5].

The situation of children in Spain improves considerably if poverty in terms of severe material deprivation is analysed (less than 8% suffered it in 2013, a value similar to the figures for France or Belgium and lower than the EU-15 average). This result should be nuanced as regards two points. On the one hand, this favourable situation is not maintained if deprivation indices that give a greater weighting to financial strain and a lower weighting to durable goods are used (Guio and Museux 2006, Martínez and Navarro 2008). On the other, Spain is a country with high levels of inequality with regard to the material deprivation borne by families, and many studies have highlighted the especially vulnerable situation of specific groups of children. In particular, child poverty has traditionally been greater among both large and single-parent families, as well as among jobless households (Cantó and Mercader 1998). Some studies using longitudinal data have detected a high recurrence of child poverty in Spain, which is linked to the high temporary work levels in the labour market (Gradín and Cantó 2012, Cantó, del Río and Gradín, 2007).

[5] It is worth pointing out that children had better values than the EU average for this indicator before the crisis.

The impact of the recent migratory boom on the level and structure of child poverty has yet to be analysed in depth. Some recent studies have stressed the significant disadvantage of children of migrant households in Spain and the increasing proportion of children of immigrant origin among the poor (Martínez 2014, De Neubourg et al. 2012b). However, the question of how the Great Recession has modified the gap between native and migrant children remains yet unclear. The economic crisis has hit both foreign and local families, but the unemployment and income impacts have been of different magnitude throughout the crisis, with native children much more affected after 2012 than over the period 2009-2011. Moreover, financial poverty and material deprivation levels were already much higher for immigrant children before the crisis, which makes it difficult to compare the worsening in relative terms. One of the goals of this paper is precisely to contribute to shed light on these questions, using the available data within the EUSILC framework.

## Research Outline

The rest of this paper investigates the crisis's impact on the risk of poverty and the living standards of children in Spain. It takes as a starting point the three dimensions included in the poverty reduction objective of the Europe 2020 Strategy (low income, material deprivation and low work intensity) and adapts these indicators to enhance their analytical capacity. Special attention is paid throughout the paper on the role played by having a migrant background as a factor for special economic and social vulnerability. It examines the extent to which the gap between migrant and native children has changed and the role played in such changes by the work situation and differences in the types of tenure and costs of the main residence.

## Measurement

**Measuring multidimensional disadvantage.** There is growing demand in the social sciences for a methodology that allows the multidimensionality of concepts like poverty, social integration or well-being to be broached. Though the idea is not new, a clear practical expansion of multidimensional approaches has only come about in the last decade through the rapid development of principles, measures and data sources[6]. In some cases, emphasis has been placed on a multi-indicator or dashboard perspective, which first aggregates within each dimension and then (as appropriate) among different dimensions. In others, measures have been proposed which aggregate each individual's different dimensions first, to generate an overall index based on individual scores subsequently. Whenever possible, this latter approach is used in this study, as it allows one to take into account the extent to which the different situations of disadvantage or deprivation coincide among the same individuals, an aspect which is relevant from the standpoint of social policy. This of course requires using a single database that provides information on the different dimensions, a fact which to some extent limits the variables to be considered.

Aside from the limitations that may arise from the available data, the choice of relevant dimensions and indicators is no easy task. As Whelan and Maître rightly point out, the fact that poverty or exclusion are multidimensional phenomena does not necessarily mean that their measurement should be so, or that including more dimensions in the analysis is necessarily better than including less. Rather, choosing a multidimensional approach should be justified on both theoretical and empirical grounds (Whelan and Maître 2012, 252). However, there is still much to be done in this field, despite the rapid

[6] Although debates on the conceptualisation of poverty have not developed at the same pace, as argued by Hick 2015 in a recent paper.

development of multidimensional poverty measures in the last two decades, at both the conceptual and the normative levels. At the same time, further research is needed on the relationship among the different dimensions, so that implicit assumptions can be tested using real world data.

In this study, the at-risk-of-poverty-and social exclusion indicator included as a target in the Europe 2020 Strategy is taken as a starting point and its possibilities and constraints as a tool to analyse the impact of the crisis on the situation of children in Spain are analysed. As is well-known, the new European indicator for monitoring the reduction of poverty over the current decade is defined on a multidimensional basis, simultaneously taking into account low income, material deprivation and employment deprivation. The indicator is regarded as a flexible benchmark agreed within the context of the so-called European “open method of coordination”, which member states will probably have to adapt to national circumstances and priorities. This paper tries in fact to contribute to this debate, suggesting possible directions of this adjustment for the Spanish case.

**Focusing on children.** Significant proposals to convert children into the true unit of measurement in studies on child poverty and well-being have been developed in recent years (World Bank 2011, Roelen and Gassmann 2008). This requires adopting an approach in which children's rights and needs guide the choice of relevant dimensions and indicators, thus overcoming the perspective which deals with child poverty as a mere subset of poverty as a whole. This would ideally require using child level indicators rather than household indicators (De Neubourg et al. 2012a, 16).

Though we essentially share this viewpoint, this study basically follows the traditional approach, which takes the household as the basic reference, due to the fact that

this is the level of reference of most of the indicators available in the data sources we use[7]. An array of material deprivation variables which refer directly to the scarcity suffered by children, though assessed by adults, is only available for 2009. This information does not allow us to assess changes after the crisis, though it could be useful to analyse the relationship between general household deprivation and child deprivation just before the crisis.

**Definitions and data source.** The data source is the Living Conditions Survey ("Encuesta de Condiciones de Vida"), which has been conducted by the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE) since 2004 and is aimed at providing comparable income and social inclusion data within the EUSILC framework. We use data from the 1st-10th waves, corresponding to the period 2004-2013[8].

Following the most common criterion in international studies, all people under the age of 18 at the end of the reference year are defined as children. In order to determine the immigrant status, the information on the place of birth appearing in the survey for all people above the age of 15 is used[9]. Applying this criterion, the percentage of the population of foreign origin above the age of 15 increased from 7.4% in 2004 to 14% in 2010 and remained steady at around this figure between 2011 and 2013. These values are slightly lower than the figures provided by the Census for the same age group, but the differences does not exceed one percentage point except in 2004 (Table A.1, Appendix).

[7]The survey also provides individual data on income, education, employment, health and other aspects, but only for household members above the age of 15 years.

[8]The version used includes revised weightings after the publication of the definitive 2011 Census results. Additionally, it should be pointed out that the income data gathering methodology changed as from ECV-2013 by combining the survey with the use of administrative data, making it difficult to compare said survey's income figures with all previous surveys.

[9]In line with other national and international studies, the place of birth criterion has been preferred over nationality to identify immigrants, and also due to the fact that the requirements for granting nationality in Spain vary greatly depending on the country of origin.

Lastly, any children who live in households whose reference person[10] is an immigrant according to the above-mentioned criterion are defined as migrant children. Thus, the analysis includes truly immigrant children (born abroad) as well as the incipient second generation.

A significant constraint of the source is that the micro-data only identify large areas of origin, which do not allow for a detailed analysis of foreigners' national origin. At most, it is possible to differentiate between migrants of EU origin and non-EU origin, but not in a perfectly comparable fashion throughout the period (see note to Table A.2)[11]. Though results have been calculated separately for children residing in households headed by a non-EU migrant in some preliminary analyses, the increase in sample error advises against employing this breakdown with this data source.

Applying the above-mentioned criteria, more than twenty out of every one hundred children currently live in households headed by an immigrant. Of these, more than fifteen out of every one hundred are of non-EU origin. An initial analysis of basic sociodemographic traits reveals there are some significant differences between native and migrant households. More specifically, immigrant children tend to live in households of a greater size, with more children and younger reference persons with lower educational attainment levels (Table A.3, Appendix). On the contrary and in contrast with other countries, there are no significant differences according to immigrant status in the percentage of children living with single parents (less than one out of every ten in both cases).

[10]The person holding responsibility for the accommodation is considered as the reference person.
[11]The population from other EU countries resident in Spain is equally divided (data for 2012) between those coming from richer Western European countries (United Kingdom, Germany, France, Portugal or Italy) and those born in Eastern Europe (mainly Romania, Bulgaria and Poland). Nevertheless, focusing the analysis on families with children greatly reduces the group's heterogeneity, as the mobility linked to tourism by retired Europeans is essentially excluded.

## Results

### The Europe 2020 Target Indicator

Figure 1 shows the average at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rates for the entire population and for different socio-demographic groups (native and immigrant children, adults and seniors aged sixty and over). According to the EU2020 target indicator, the overall risk of poverty and social exclusion[12] has increased from around 24% during the period 2005-2008 to 28% in 2012[13]. This increase, though high in comparative terms within the European context, turns out to be surprisingly modest in a country with an unemployment rate that has increased by more than three times and where income of the poorest households has fallen by more than ten per cent in real terms. As will be seen further below, this is mainly due to the significant weight of the at-risk-of-poverty rate, which is calculated on a purely relative income threshold, within the overall indicator.

[12]The AROPE indicator is defined as the share of the population in at least one of the following three conditions: 1) At risk of poverty, meaning having adjusted household disposable incomes below the poverty threshold, defined as 60% national median income. 2) In a situation of severe material deprivation, meaning not being able to afford at least four of the following nine items: i) To pay their rent, mortgage or utility bills. ii) To keep their home adequately warm. iii) To face unexpected expenses. iv) To eat meat or proteins regularly. v) To go on holiday. vi) A television set. vii) A washing machine. viii) A car. ix) A telephone). 3) Living in a household with very low work intensity, that is, people aged 0-59 living in households where the adults (those aged 18-59, but excluding students aged 18-24) worked less than 20% of their total potential during the previous 12 months.

[13]The data for 2013 is not fully comparable with previous data due to the change in methodology used to obtain income (see note to Figures 1 and 2).

**Figure 1.** At-Risk-of Poverty or Exclusion Rates in Spain, 2004-2013




*Source:* Own research using ECV data, 1st-10th waves.

*Notes:* (B) Break in the series due to the implementation of a new methodology to estimate income data in the ECV, combining survey and administrative data.

By groups, the worsening of the at-risk-of-poverty or exclusion rate has been more severe for working age adults, while seniors have significantly improved their relative situation since the crisis began. Throughout the period, children have maintained risk rates one fifth the population as a whole, distancing themselves from seniors during the period of crisis. The breakdown according to the household head's place of origin makes it clear that differences between children and the total population are basically driven by immigrant children outcomes. Native children are similar to the population as a whole, while migrant children differ greatly, with risk rates above 50% even before the beginning of the crisis.

A differentiated analysis of the three dimensions that make up the Europe 2020 indicator helps to sketch out these disparities and the changes which have come about in recent years. On the one hand, it should be pointed out that, in Spain, low income rates and

trends determine around 90% of the level and evolution of the Europe 2020 poverty or exclusion indicator. The contribution made by the other two dimensions is small. In both cases, Spain recorded better values than the EU15 average before the crisis. In 2012, this positive position was maintained in the case of material deprivation. However, it was severely eroded for the work intensity indicator, which recorded the third worst result in the EU-28, thereby reflecting the intense destruction of employment.

**Figure 2.** Low Income, Low Work Intensity, Severe Material Deprivation and Overall Risk-of-Poverty or Exclusion in Spain 2004-2012



**Immigrant Children**




*Source:* Own research using ECV data, 1st-9th waves.

*Notes:* Dotted lines in the Graphs represent the 95% confidence intervals around the central estimates.

In any event, Figure 2 shows that the risk structure is different between immigrant and native children. Two aspects are well worth highlighting. On the one hand, children living in migrant households have low income rates which are two times higher than those of children living in native households. However, their levels of severe material deprivation are more than three times higher in all the years under study. On the other, the problem of very low work intensity was of a low magnitude for the two kinds of household before the crisis (the differences are not significant for a 95% confidence level[14]) and tended to rise during the years of crisis. The rise, however, was much more intense for immigrant children. Thus, although the gap in the overall risk indicator has not varied significantly during the crisis, the years of recession have added a further disadvantage for migrant children (greater parents' unemployment) to already pre-existing disadvantages (lower household income and greater severe material deprivation).

[14] To compute confidence intervals we have followed the procedure recommended by Goedemé 2010. These calculations are available on request to the authors.

### Deconstructing AROPE

The indicator chosen as the official target to monitor poverty reduction within the Europe 2020 Strategy has strengths and weaknesses, which were analysed in a previous work (Martínez and Ruiz-Huerta 2014). One of the main constraints is the use of an aggregation methodology based on a simple head-count union approach, thereby ignoring differences in the degree of overlap among the three dimensions mentioned above. This kind of measure is neither sensitive to the number of deprived dimensions of those identified as poor nor to the size of the gaps within each domain. The index will therefore not change if, for instance, a household having only low income in year *t* begins to suffer material and/or employment deprivation in year *t+1*, since it has been already counted as a household at risk.

A second questionable aspect concerns the specific choice made of the indicators and thresholds used, as this entails combining an indirect, relative viewpoint on poverty linked to each country's internal inequality (low income) with a direct viewpoint which is more associated to a low absolute standard of living (severe material deprivation), along with a possible causal factor for poverty (low work intensity). Though the work intensity indicator could be supported by the notion of reflecting the exclusion associated to the loss of employment, its theoretical and empirical justification has caused much debate among experts[15].

[15] As Nolan and Whelan (2011, 18) put it, "At a conceptual level, the argument for including in the target population persons living in households that are jobless but are neither on low income (relative to their own country's median income) not materially deprived (relative to a common EU wide standard) is unclear. Joblessness might be better thought of as a factor leading to income poverty or material deprivation than as an indicator of poverty. Empirical analysis then shows that the group added to the target population by the inclusion of the joblessness/low work intensity criterion has a relatively high proportion from the professional and managerial classes and a relatively low proportion from the working class, and that being in this group is not associated with high levels of economic stress".

All this has important implications, because the same overall index level can conceal very dissimilar at-risk profiles in different territories or social groups, which in turn can have clear consequences on policy design. Thus, even if we are willing to accept that a simple union approach serves the aim of providing an estimate of the size of the "at-risk" population well, other complementary measures based on an "intersection" or and "intermediate" approach could be useful to analyse differences in deprivation profiles in a meaningful way for social policy.

Table 2 takes a first step in this direction by performing a sequential overlapping deprivation analysis based on current AROPE dimensions and indicators for two points in time, 2008 and 2012. The choice of the second date was conditioned by the difficulty of directly comparing 2013 income with that of previous years due to the change in the methodology used to obtain income data as of said year. For two and three-dimensional analyses, the table shows head-count ratios (H) for both the union and the intersection approaches, as well as the Alkire-Foster's Adjusted Headcount Ratio ($M_0$) for different dimensional cut-offs[16].

[16] The Alkire-Foster class of multidimensional measures can be described as a parametric set of indices representing a multidimensional generalization of the original Foster, Greer and Thorbecke 1984 poverty measures. The Adjusted Headcount Ratio ($M_0$) is the most widely used A-F measure. For a given y=[$y_{ij}$] matrix of achievements and a given vector $z$ of dimensional deprivation cut-offs, the Adjusted Headcount Ratio $M_0(y,z)$ is defined as the mean of the (weighted) censored deprivation matrix. This measure can be also expressed as the product of the multidimensional headcount H(y,z) and the normalized average deprivation score among the poor A(y,z). See Alkire and Foster 2011a, 2011b for a more detailed explanation of this index.

**Table 2.** AROPE Based Sequential Overlapping Deprivation Analysis, 2008 and 2012

| | Native Children | | Immigrant Children | | All Children | | Whole Population | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dimensions/Measures | 2008 | 2012 | 2008 | 2012 | 2008 | 2012 | 2008 | 2012 |
| **One dimension** | | | | | | | | |
| Low income | 22.8 | 24.1 | 48.3 | 50.4 | 28.2 | 29.9 | 20.8 | 22.2 |
| Severe deprivation | 2.6 | 5.1 | 16.5 | 16.3 | 5.5 | 7.6 | 3.6 | 5.8 |
| Low work intensity | 4.5 | 10.3 | 3.9 | 20.2 | 4.4 | 12.7 | 5.3 | 11.4 |
| **Two dimensions** | | | | | | | | |
| *Low income- Severe deprivation* | | | | | | | | |
| H Union | 23.4 | 25.4 | 52.4 | 55.4 | 29.6 | 32.1 | 22.4 | 24.5 |
| H Intersection | 1.9 | 3.7 | 12.4 | 11.3 | 4.1 | 5.4 | 2.0 | 3.5 |
| $M_0$ Cut-off=1 | 12.7 | 14.6 | 32.4 | 33.4 | 16.9 | 18.7 | 12.2 | 14.0 |
| *Low income-Low work intensity* | | | | | | | | |
| H Union | 23.9 | 26.3 | 48.8 | 51.6 | 29.2 | 31.9 | 23.1 | 26.3 |
| H Intersection | 3.4 | 8.1 | 3.5 | 19.0 | 3.4 | 10.5 | 3.0 | 7.2 |
| $M_0$ Cut-off=1 | 13.6 | 17.2 | 26.1 | 35.3 | 16.3 | 21.2 | 13.0 | 16.8 |
| *Severe deprivation-Low work intensity* | | | | | | | | |
| H Union | 6.3 | 12.7 | 20.1 | 28.9 | 9.2 | 16.3 | 8.3 | 14.9 |
| H Intersection | 0.8 | 2.8 | 0.4 | 7.6 | 0.7 | 3.8 | 0.6 | 2.4 |
| $M_0$ Cut-off=1 | 3.6 | 7.7 | 10.2 | 18.3 | 5.0 | 10.1 | 4.4 | 8.6 |
| **Three dimensions** | | | | | | | | |
| H Union (AROPE) | 24.6 | 27.4 | 52.9 | 56.5 | 30.6 | 33.9 | 24.6 | 28.3 |
| H Intersection | 0.8 | 2.5 | 0.4 | 7.6 | 0.7 | 3.6 | 0.5 | 2.1 |
| $M_0$ Cut-off=1 | 10.0 | 13.2 | 22.9 | 29.0 | 12.7 | 16.7 | 9.9 | 13.1 |
| $M_0$ Cut-off=2 | 3.2 | 7.2 | 10.4 | 17.8 | 4.8 | 9.6 | 3.2 | 6.7 |

*Source:* Own research with ECV data, 5th and 9th waves, using DASP Stata package version 2.3 developed by Araar Abdelkrim and Jean-Yves Duclos.

Several conclusions are worth pointing out. First, the most common at-risk profile on both dates is that of children living in low-income families, not severely deprived and not classified as low work intensity households. This predominance is much more common among native families than among immigrants (according to 2008 data, 74% of all native children at risk were situated in this group, as opposed to 62% of migrant children), and fell in both cases during the crisis (to 54% and 49% respectively). Figure 3 below, which reflects

the percentage of children in the different at-risk profiles in 2008 and 2009, allows us to easily grasp this fact.

**Figure 3.** Different AROPE Profiles for Native and Immigrant Children, 2008 and 2012




*Source:* Own research using ECV data, 5th and 9th waves.

Second, the weight of the remaining profiles varies depending on the year and group. Before the crisis, the second most frequent profile for immigrant children was the low income *and* severe material deprivation *without* low work intensity profile (one out of every four children at risk). Severe material deprivation even without low income or low work intensity was the third most frequent profile. For native children, however, the second most relevant profile was low income and low work intensity (without severe material deprivation), which accounted for about one out of every ten children at risk. After the crisis, this profile became twice as frequent. In addition, the number of children living in households suffering the three kinds of scarcity, which were statistically irrelevant in 2008, doubled and included 3% of children of Spanish origin. In the case of migrant family children, the crisis led to an even more intense rise in the risk of being deprived at

the same time in the three dimensions (8% of immigrant children), or combining low income and low work intensity (12% of immigrant children). On the other hand, the low income and material deprivation without low work intensity profile fell by eight percentage points.

Third, the above-mentioned differences necessarily mean that the magnitude of changes in the risk of suffering poverty or exclusion depends on the specific measure used. If the official Europe 2020 indicator is used, the increases are moderate and of the same magnitude (in relative terms) for both migrant and native children. On the other hand, if an intersection approach is used, the rise in the risk of suffering poverty was intense during the crisis and has had a disproportionate impact on migrant children when simultaneously considering all three dimensions, as well as in the two-by-two analyses (except in the case of the low income and material deprivation combination). Given the low number of dimensions, it should also be noted that the differences between the union and intersection approaches are much more decisive than the differences resulting from using a head-count type index or the Alkire-Foster $M_0$ measure.

This conclusion, though important, is of limited scope due to the restrictive nature of the notion of severe material deprivation included in the Europe 2020 indicator, which is barely suitable to assess the true extent of the economic difficulties encountered by families in a country like Spain. This is partly due to the high weighting given to durable goods (television, telephone, dish washer and car), which are almost universally owned by most Spanish households and whose ownership is not very sensitive to the economic cycle[17], as well as because of the low total number of indicators and the scale's low overall reliability. At an aggregate level, this strict definition entails that severe material deprivation affects a little more than 6% of the population, even after five years of crisis, as

[17]As difficulties only become evident at the moment such goods are renewed. This question is analysed in more detail in Martínez and Navarro (2014), where alternative measures are also developed.

opposed to the more than 20% receiving low incomes. This obviously limits the usefulness of the intersection approach to identify the at-risk population, and for that reason, we will use the somewhat less strict concept of material deprivation in the next section of this paper.

Other feature of the Europe 2020 indicator that has contributed to underestimate changes throughout the crisis has been the reduction of the poverty threshold itself during the crisis, due to declining real incomes of Spanish population. To overcome this problem, while also increasing consistency with the not-so-relative poverty approach implicit in material deprivation, next section explores changes during the crisis using the same poverty line in both dates 2008 and 2012.

Lastly and apart from the changes resulting from the crisis, the differences in low income levels and especially (severe) material deprivation among Spanish and migrant families, even before the beginning of the recession and despite similar levels of work intensity, are striking, though not unexpected. Although low work intensity undoubtedly turns out to be a factor for exclusion, the data presented above reveal that work did not provide a sure path to escape from poverty and material deprivation for a significant number of migrant families with children in either 2008 or 2012.

**Anchored Low Income and Material Deprivation**

Of the three dimensions included in the official Europe 2020 indicator, material deprivation is the most direct poverty indicator and the one which best reflects to what extent things that we usually assume that "could happen" (Micklewright 2002, 3) if a household has low work intensity and/or insufficient income do really come about in practice. The previous analysis suggests that the negative consequences on the standard of

living were, as a matter of fact, much more intense among immigrant families than among native families both before and after the start of the crisis.

This issue is analysed in greater detail in this section using the same list of items included in the Europe 2020 indicator, but relaxing the threshold by defining as materially deprived people living in households lacking three or more elements out of nine, instead of four of more. In other words, we replace the concept of "severe material deprivation" for just "material deprivation". Following this definition, 19% of children were deprived in 2012, four percentage points above 2008 level. At the same time, we use an anchored poverty line to delimit the low income population, in order to avoid children being classified as non poor in 2012 due merely to decreasing median income. With this approach, child poverty rate rose from 28% in 2008 to 36% in 2012, a rise significantly higher than the one found using a mobile threshold. We also pay attention to the overlap between the two criteria, which delimits what some authors have called "consistent poverty"[18] and which would affect about 13% of children in 2012, in contrast with only 8% four years before.

Table 3 shows how low anchored income, material deprivation and "consistent poverty" among children have changed between 2008 and 2012, according to migrant status. It also shows changes for both native and migrant children depending on the level of work intensity and the housing tenure of the household in which they live. This last variable is highly relevant to understand the gap in terms of material deprivation and "consistent poverty", given that the same level of income may serve to escape poverty or not depending on housing tenure and costs (Tunstall et al. 2013, Nicholas & Ray 2012). It is also important when assessing the effects of the crisis on children's living standards, as

[18] See, for example, Maître et al. (2013, 2006), Layte et al. (2001) or Nolan and Whelan (1996).

being in debt worsens the negative impact of losing a job, while accumulated wealth or savings cushion it.

**Table 3. Anchored Low Income and Material Deprivation in Spain, 2008 and 2012**

| | Population shares % | | Low income (anchored) | | Material deprivation | | Both LI and MD | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2008 | 2012 | 2008 | 2012 | 2008 | 2012 | 2008 | 2012 |
| **Global results** | | | | | | | | |
| Children <18 | 18 | 18 | 28 | 36 | 15 | 19 | 8 | 13 |
| - Native Children | 14 | 14 | 23 | 30 | 9 | 14 | 4 | 9 |
| - Immigrant Children | 4 | 4 | 48 | 59 | 36 | 39 | 22 | 28 |
| Adults 18-59 | 60 | 61 | 17 | 28 | 11 | 17 | 4 | 10 |
| Seniors 60+ | 22 | 21 | 25 | 23 | 7 | 11 | 3 | 5 |
| Whole Population | 100 | 100 | 21 | 28 | 11 | 16 | 5 | 9 |
| | | | | | | | | |
| **Native Children** | | | | | | | | |
| *Low work intensity of the household* | | | | | | | | |
| - Very low | 5 | 10 | 74 | 84 | 36 | 45 | 32 | 41 |
| - Not very low | 95 | 90 | 20 | 23 | 8 | 10 | 3 | 5 |
| *Housing tenure* | | | | | | | | |
| - Outright owner | 33 | 33 | 26 | 35 | 6 | 9 | 3 | 7 |
| - Paying mortgage | 53 | 53 | 16 | 22 | 8 | 13 | 3 | 7 |
| - Renting | 7 | 7 | 41 | 53 | 30 | 36 | 20 | 26 |
| - Provided for free | 7 | 7 | 35 | 44 | 13 | 17 | 6 | 14 |
| **Migrant Children** | | | | | | | | |
| *Low work intensity of the household* | | | | | | | | |
| - Very low | 4 | 20 | .. | 95 | .. | 61 | .. | 58 |
| - Not very low | 96 | 80 | 47 | 50 | 36 | 33 | 21 | 20 |
| *Housing tenure* | | | | | | | | |
| - Outright owner | 4 | 7 | .. | 33 | .. | 11 | .. | 11 |
| - Paying mortgage | 37 | 31 | 27 | 57 | 30 | 38 | 12 | 23 |
| - Renting | 57 | 57 | 62 | 63 | 42 | 45 | 30 | 34 |
| - Provided for free | 2 | 5 | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. | .. |

*Source:* Own research using ECV data, 5th and 9th waves.

*Notes:* (..) Not available (less than < 75 cases in horizontal category).
Anchored low income: Adjusted income lower than 2008 relative poverty line, updated using the CPI.
Material deprivation: 3+ items lacked out of the nine items included in the Eurostat list.
Consistent poverty: Simultaneously having low income and material deprivation.

Results in Table 3 show that, for the whole population, income poverty rose by about one third, material deprivation by about 50%, and the overlap between low income and material deprivation by about 100%. Children are the most disadvantaged age group

both before and after the crisis, with higher than average values in the three indicators, but especially in consistent poverty. However, their overall relative risk tended to decrease slightly, compared to adults (bur not to seniors). It is worth noting that native children's position deteriorated more than immigrants' in relative terms, but keeping around average values. For migrant children, low income and consistent poverty increased by around 25%, whilst levels of material deprivation remained fixed at nearly 40% in both dates.

It is clear from Table 3 that low work intensity is associated to higher levels of material deprivation and consistent poverty among children of both migrant and native Spanish families, both in 2008 and, even more, in 2012. According to the data for 2012, 84% of native children and 95% of immigrant children in low work intensity households lived on a low income, and 41% and 58% respectively combined low income and material deprivation. A second fact worth pointing out is that material deprivation rates are higher among immigrant children irrespective of work intensity levels, with the greatest differences in percentage terms recorded not among households with very low, but rather with intermediate or high work intensity. In fact, only 5% of children in Spanish households not reporting very low work intensity were "consistently" poor in 2012, compared to 20% for migrant children.

Households' housing tenure is also highly relevant in explaining the relationship between low income, material deprivation and consistent poverty among children. Firstly, children living in a house owned with no mortgage have lower than average poverty and deprivation rates. Though risk of poverty and deprivation has increased since 2008 for this group of children, they still maintain their advantaged position in 2012. It is important to highlight that this housing regime covers one third of native children, but only 7% of immigrant children (2012 data).

Secondly, children living in rented homes were a particularly disadvantaged group, both in 2008 and 2012. Among migrant children, they represented the majority group, since about 57% of them lived in families paying a rent for their accommodation. Among native families, they represented instead a minority group (7%), characterized by much higher poverty, deprivation and consistent poverty rates than native-born children with other housing arrangements. The economic crisis has worsened more intensely the situation of the latter, so that 26% of them combined low income and material deprivation in 2012, eight points below their migrant counterparts. This group is mainly comprised of very young low-income families holding precarious jobs, which had been unable to initiate the process of purchasing their own home and whose work and financial situation have further deteriorated during the crisis (Table A.4).

Thirdly, children of families living in mortgaged houses have experienced a marked deterioration during the crisis, but maintaining a sharp differentiation in poverty levels according to migrant status of the household head. For native families, low income, deprivation and consistent poverty measures rose by around five points between 2008 and 2012, an increase remarkable in relative terms, but which kept poverty rates well below the national average, and similar to those of children living in not mortgaged houses. Things got worse for the 37% of migrant children whose parents were purchasing a property in 2008. Their low income rates increased by thirty points (from 27% to 57%) in only four years, due to the rapid rise in low work intensity rates of this group of households throughout the period (from around 6% to 24%, see Table A.4). As a result, one in four immigrant children living in mortgaged houses combined low income and material deprivation in 2012, twice the value obtained for 2008 and more than three times the rate of native-born children living in the same situation.

To sum up, the crisis has aggravated the situation of a (progressively immigrant) working class that had already found itself in a precarious situation at the peak of the economic boom, due to precarious and low-paid employment and high housing costs. The Great Recession has especially worsened the prospects of families in the process of consolidating their migratory projects, which had being earning sufficient income to start purchasing their own home. However, it has also punished hardly a minority of native-born children, especially among young, low-income families hardest hit by unemployment with high housing cost.

## Concluding Remarks

According to the official indicator included in the Europe 2020 Strategy, the at-risk of poverty or exclusion rate of children rose by less than 10% in the first four years of the crisis, both for immigrant and native children, This is a rather moderate change for a country where unemployment rates have tripled and real incomes fallen significantly. This paper has argued that this overall diagnosis can be qualified from different points of view.

First, the Euro-indicator is not sensitive to the degree of overlap among the three dimensions considered (low income, severe material deprivation and very low work intensity). Similarly, this indicator is not sensitive to the size of the gaps in each dimension either, something that can be of some importance if the multidimensional profile differs across groups. We have shown that this is precisely the case when we disaggregate data by migrant status of the household head, with a much greater risk of combining low income and severe material deprivation among immigrant families, irrespective of work intensity levels. Immigrant children had in 2008 low income and, especially, severe material deprivation levels much higher than their Spanish counterparts, even though an

overwhelming majority of them lived in “hard working” households, after a decade of strong economic growth and migratory boom.

In 2012, many migrant households had added unemployment to their pre-crisis disadvantaged position in the other two fields, which implied a disproportionate rise in the size of the “three-times poor” group. At a lower pace, the degree of overlap between the three dimensions also increased for children of Spanish-born parents, intensifying the risk of poverty or exclusion to an extent not well captured by the AROPE indicator.

Additionally, due to the variables and thresholds chosen, the Europe 2020 measure is overdetermined in Spain by the conventional at-risk-of-poverty rate, with very low real weight left for the other two dimensions (low intensity and, especially, material deprivation). On the other side, the choice of the dimensions and variables included in the AROPE measure makes it difficult to extract policy implications from the results, since the statistic mixes together an indirect, resource-based and relative measure of poverty (low income) with a direct, standard of living based and fixed poverty indicator (severe material deprivation) and a potential cause of poverty (low work intensity) – which, as we have seen, does not produce the same consequences among native and immigrant children.

We have shown that the impact of the Great Recession on low income and material deprivation of children are significantly higher when we change the thresholds used in the original Europe 2020 indicator, applying an anchored poverty line and the less restrictive concept of material deprivation (lacking three or more items of the Eurostat list). Moreover, the degree of overlap between these two measures has increased even more markedly over the period of crisis than the two dimensions taken separately. In *relative terms*, the crisis has deteriorated most the position of native children, especially in terms of material deprivation and “consistent” poverty, reducing the origin-related gap. In spite of these adverse changes, native-born children maintained in 2012 levels of poverty and

deprivation close to the average values. By contrast, immigrant children still had in 2012 low income, material poverty and consistent poverty rates between two and three times higher than those of native-born children.

We have highlighted as well the role played by differences in housing tenure and costs in explaining these trends. Unlike native children, most migrant children live in a rented accommodation or in mortgaged homes with high outstanding repayments, as they were purchased in the years leading up to the bursting of the housing bubble. This fact increased significantly the risk of living in a materially deprived household already before the crisis, even when earning wages. After the crisis, the situation of mortgaged immigrant families deteriorated even further due to the abrupt rise in unemployment in this group, approaching their poverty indicators to the majority and more disadvantaged group of (mainly immigrant) families living in rented flats.

Spain is currently one of worst performers within the EU-28 in terms of financial child poverty. We have shown that this bad position is basically driven by immigrant children outcomes, a worrying result if we care about the long-term success of the immigrants integration process. The crisis has made evident the scarcity and inadequacy of the Spanish safety nets regarding disadvantaged working families, both of foreign and Spanish origin. This weakness constitutes, in our view, a political issue that merits thorough reflection. If the way children are treated is a measure of civilisation that also shapes the future of a society, as the first UNICEF report on child poverty in rich countries affirmed almost fifteen years ago (UNICEF 2000, 23), Spain still has a very long way to go to improve outcomes in this critical domain.

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# Appendix

**Table A.1.** Population above 16 Years of Age Residing in Spain by Place of Birth

| | **2004** | **2005** | **2006** | **2007** | **2008** | **2009** | **2010** | **2011** | **2012** | **2013** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Spain | 92.6 | 90.8 | 89.9 | 88.5 | 87.3 | 86.8 | 86.2 | 86.3 | 86.1 | 86.3 |
| Abroad, EU | 2.5 | 2.9 | 2.8 | 3.5 | 3.9 | 4.4 | 4.1 | 4.4 | 4.1 | 4.0 |
| Abroad, Non-EU | 4.9 | 6.3 | 7.3 | 8.0 | 8.8 | 8.8 | 9.7 | 9.4 | 9.8 | 9.6 |
| Abroad, Total | 7.4 | 9.2 | 10.1 | 11.5 | 12.7 | 13.2 | 13.8 | 13.7 | 13.9 | 13.7 |
| *Census Data* | *8.7* | *9.9* | *11.1* | *12.2* | *13.6* | *14.3* | *14.5* | *14.5* | *14.6* | *14.5* |

*Source:* Own research using ECV data, 1st-10th waves. INE for Census Data.

*Note:* EU includes other countries belonging to the EU-27 between 2010 and 2013. Between 2004 and 2009, this category includes people born in an EU-25 country, along with those born in other European countries.

**Table A.2.** % Distribution of Children according to Migrant Status of Household Reference Person

| | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Native | 91 | 85 | 83 | 81 | 79 | 78 | 78 | 78 | 78 | 79 |
| Immigrant | 9 | 15 | 17 | 19 | 21 | 22 | 22 | 22 | 22 | 21 |
| EU | 2 | 3 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 5 | 5 |
| Non-EU | 7 | 12 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 17 | 16 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| *(Million)* | *7.5* | *7.6* | *7.8* | *7.9* | *8.1* | *8.2* | *8.3* | *8.3* | *8.4* | *8.4* |

*Source:* Own research using ECV data, 1st-10th waves.

*Note:* EU includes other countries belonging to the EU-27 between 2010 and 2013. Between 2005 and 2009, this category includes people born in an EU-25 country, along with those born in other European countries.

**Table A.3.** Family Background of Children According to Migrant Status of Reference Person, 2012

| | Native Children | Migrant Children |
|---|---|---|
| Household size | 4.0<br>*(3.9–4.0)* | 4.4<br>*(4.2–4.6)* |
| Number of children in the household | 1.8<br>(1.7–1.8) | 2.1<br>(2.0–2.2) |
| Living in households with 3+ children aged <18 | 12.4<br>(10.6–14.2) | 27.1<br>(20.9–33.3) |
| Living in a large households (6+ members) | 5.2<br>(4.1–6.4) | 16.7<br>(11.3–22.1) |
| Reference person aged <35 | 12.5<br>(11.0–14.1) | 26.6<br>(20.7–32.5) |
| Reference person married/Common low | 90.0<br>(88.8–91.2) | 87.4<br>(83.7–91.2) |
| Lone parent (only 1 adult living in the household) | 6.6<br>(5.5–7.6) | 5.5<br>(2.5–8.5) |
| Low level of education or reference person (primary or less) | 12.1<br>(10.7–13.6) | 24.3<br>(19.1–29.5) |
| Reference person has university degree | 35.7<br>(33.5–38.0) | 19.7<br>(14.6–24.7) |

*Source:* Own research using ECV data, 9th wave.

*Note:* 95% confidence intervals given in brackets.

**Table A.4.** Socio-demographic Profile of Children Living in Rented and Mortgaged Houses, 2008 and 2012

| | **Renting** | | **Acceding to property** | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 2008 | 2012 | 2008 | 2012 |
| **Native Children** | | | | |
| Reference person aged <35 | 25.8 | 27.2 | 20.4 | 16.2 |
| Low level of education or reference person (primary or less) | 25.1 | 26.8 | 12.6 | 6.6 |
| Fixed-term contract in current or last job | 48.0 | 31.6 | 18.2 | 20.5 |
| Very low work intensity | 16.2 | 32.8 | 2.4 | 5.5 |
| Mean equivalised income | 10,015 | 9,351 | 15,246 | 15,039 |
| **Migrant Children** | | | | |
| Reference person aged <35 | 33.2 | 33.2 | 39.4 | 18.7 |
| Low level of education or reference person (primary or less) | 34.3 | 26.9 | 22.7 | 16.6 |
| Fixed-term contract in current or last job | 52.2 | 42.6 | 38.1 | 42.9 |
| Very low work intensity | 5.7 | 24.2 | 4.7 | 15.9 |
| Mean equivalised income | 8,024 | 8,400 | 12,270 | 8,565 |

*Source:* Own research using ECV data, 5th and 9th waves.