Individual preferences for protectionism : do economic factors really matter?.

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A common scenario for international commerce is the existence of restrictions on free trade, even when the majority of economists agree on the benefits of it, whatever the country's size or whatever the country's economic development. In contexts where politicians offer different policy options and voters demand them based on their individual preferences, one may ask what determines individuals preferences on trade policy; which economic, cultural, social elements shape them. Our goal in this paper is to answer these questions for a heterogeneous sample which includes developed and developing countries and small and big ones such as: Australia, Austria, Denmark, Germany, Japan, Latvia, Norway, South Africa, United States, Uruguay among others.

In this paper we use data from the module on National Identity of the 2003 *International Social Survey Program* (ISSP). Based on an ordered probit model, we conclude that elements such as religion, political preferences, and nationalism, as well as demographic characteristics and country performance, have a significant impact on trade policy preferences.

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Introduction.

Even when the majority of economists agree on the benefits of free trade, everywhere we turn to, trade is restricted. Endogenous trade policy models describe political contexts where politicians offer different policy options and voters demand them based on their individual preferences. It is the institutional background the key element that determines how this supply and demand interact and translate into actual trade policies. Thus, one may ask, what determines personal preferences on trade policy; which economic, cultural, social elements shape them. The aim of this paper is to answer these questions in the case of a great variety of countries included in the sample.

In this paper we use data from the module on National Identity of the 2003 International Social Survey Program (ISSP). The ISSP is an ongoing effort devoted to cross-national research on social attitudes. In addition to asking general questions about attitudes towards social issues, the ISSP series also includes special topic modules focusing on matters such as national identity and the role of government. The individuals were sampled across all five continents and the survey asks respondents (approximately 1.400 in each country) their opinions on issues, including trade preferences, patriotism and politics. In addition, it includes demographic and socio-economic data.

We estimate ordered probit models in order to study the impact of each of these variables on individual preferences on trade policy. We conclude that elements such as religion, political preferences, and nationalism, as well as demographic characteristics and country performance, have a significant impact on trade policy preferences.

In the first section of this paper we introduce briefly the theory on the subject. In section two we describe the data used in this paper. In section three we show the estimated model and in section four we present our findings. Finally in section five we conclude.

1. Fundamentals of individual preferences for protectionism.

1.1. Economic factors.

A common scenario for international commerce is the existence of restrictions on free trade, even when the majority of economists agree on the benefits of it, whatever the country's size or whatever the country's economic development. More particularly, small economies usually benefit more from openness given the relative smaller size of their domestic markets. Even more, there is a consensus among economists that this type of economies cannot grow steadily if it is not through opening its borders to the world[1].

The question that inevitably arises is, why do governments choose trade policies that are apparently sub-optimal? The literature on this subject has tried to explain this phenomenon based on the idea that policy makers have objectives that differ from economic maximization. There are basically two trends in "endogenous" trade policy determination theory: the median-voter model and the interest group model.

The median-voter model supposes a uni-dimensional policy choice (for example, an import tariff to a particular good), the policy preferences are single-peaked and a given policy is voted directly or the government chooses the policy that better reflects the majority's opinion on that subject. In this context, the policy preference chosen by the median voter cannot be dominated by any other alternative in a majority voting (Black, 1958). On the other hand, in the interest groups model, the economic interests are represented by organized lobby groups, and it is through their interaction with the government that trade policy is designed (Gawande y Krishna, 2001).

[1] As early as Adam Smith expressed in the "Wealth of Nations": *"In countries, besides, less extensive … they generally require the support of foreign trade. Without an extensive foreign market they could not well flourish,… in countries so moderately extensive as to afford but a narrow home market …"* (Book IV Chapter IX).

Both models describe a political context where politicians offer different policy options and voters demand policies based on their individual preferences, and the institutional background determines how this supply and demand interact and translate into actual trade policies (O'Rourke et al., 2001). Thus, one may ask, what are the determinants of personal preferences on trade policy? Which economic, cultural, social elements affect them? The aim of this paper is to answer these questions.

International trade models provide a first approach to this issue. The two basic models are the Hecksher-Ohlin model (H-O) that supposes complete factor mobility and the Ricardo-Viner model (R-V) that includes specific factors. Although they provide opposing predictions on trade policy preferences based on the differing consequences of free trade in each country given by their different specialization patterns; there is no contradiction between those models given the assumption about factor's mobility. There is academic consensus on considering the H-O model as a long-run model and the R-V model as a short-run model.

The H-O model supposes complete costless factor mobility across sectors and predicts that trade liberalization will benefit those who hold the relatively abundant factor and be detrimental to those who own the relatively scarce one. This implies that trade policy preference will differ among individuals depending on their relative factor endowment. On the other hand, the R-V model assumes the existence of sector-specific factors, and therefore predicts that individual trade policy preferences will depend on whether they are employed in an import-substituting or export industry (Gawande et al., 2001).

As it was mentioned, in the specific case of labour these models should not be considered necessarily as opposites, since one or the other could be applicable depending on the individual time horizon. People with a relatively short time horizon will see themselves as immobile and therefore, their preferences will be those predicted by the R-V model, however, people with a long time horizon will take into account the possibility of inter-sector mobility and their preferences will be determined as described in the H-O model (Scheve and Slaugther, 2001).

In the H-O model with two goods, two production factors (skilled and unskilled labour) and two countries (S abundant in unskilled labour and N abundant in skilled labour), a reduction in trade barriers causes each country to specializes in the production of the good intensive in their relatively abundant factor, increasing the demand for this factor in its country and therefore its return. Consequently, wage inequality will decrease in country S and increase in country N. For this reason, unskilled workers in country S will support free trade while skilled workers will oppose it, however in country N skilled workers will support free trade and unskilled workers will oppose it. In reference to trade policy preferences, based on this model one would expect that unskilled workers in developing countries (where unskilled labour is abundant) would prefer free trade while skilled workers would oppose it, and that the opposite would be true for developed countries, where skilled labour is abundant.

Mayda and Rodrik (2001) made a comparative analysis of twenty three countries and conclude that the evidence supports the H-O model. They find that people with higher endowments of human capital oppose trade restrictions only in countries that are abundant in human capital, like Germany and USA, while in Philippines (the poorest country in their sample), the opposite happens. The remaining countries in the sample are half way between those two extremes. Consequently, trade policy preferences not only depend on each person's individual characteristics (years of schooling) but also to their country's (education level in the country).

However, in general the empirical evidence shows that both in developed and developing countries the more qualified is a person the less likely he or she is to oppose free trade. Moreover, trade liberalization in a developing country does not necessarily cause a reduction in wage inequality between skilled and unskilled labour, but quite the opposite. For example, in the case of Uruguay, Arim and Zoppolo (2000) showed that the wage differences associated to formal education increased during the nineties, when the country was going through a process of increasing trade

liberalization and regional integration. Moreover, they show that the demand for skilled labour increased both relatively to the demand for unskilled labour and in absolute terms.

How can this fact be explained? One possible explanation of this phenomenon is that trade liberalization could increase direct foreign investment in the developing country, which could bring about the development of new activities that are intensive in skilled labour (Feenstra and Hanson, 1996). In the case of Uruguay, Arim et al. (2001) argued that trade liberalization and regional integration caused significant changes in the country's productive structure and employment in each sector, decreasing the relevance of manufacture (both in GDP and employment) and increasing the importance of sector such as construction, financial services and other services for enterprises.

On the other hand, if skilled labour and capital are complementary in the exploitation of a specific natural resource, wage inequality in a developing country could increase with trade liberalization, which would explain why skilled workers in developing countries may prefer free trade. Additionally, people with higher education anywhere in the world may be more flexible and more able to deal with the rigors of the market, and therefore more likely to support trade liberalization (O'Rourke et al., 2001).

Furthermore, even in a model of two factors, developing countries are not homogenous in terms of their factor endowments. In some of them a certain factor may be scarce relative to developed countries but abundant relative to other developing countries (O'Rourke et al., 2001), if trade liberalization intensifies trade with other developing countries with lower human capital endowment, wage inequality could increase as it would in a developed country.

Finally, another element to be considered is mobility both national and international. In respect to national mobility, the idea is that those willing or more able to reallocate within the country would be more optimistic regarding the dislocation implicit in trade liberalization than those who are immobile.

In the case of international mobility, following Rodrik (1997), the argument is that globalization tends to favour production factors that are internationally mobile than those that are immobile, if unskilled labour is less mobile than skilled labour, unskilled workers everywhere will oppose free trade (O'Rourke et al., 2001).

Summing up, if some of the model's assumptions are lifted (more than two factors, international flows of production factors, links between trade and technology transfers, etc.) the theoretical result regarding trade liberalization and wages becomes ambiguous (O'Rourke et al., 2001) and therefore, so do its conclusions regarding trade policy preferences.

1.2. Non economic factors.

In analysing the determinants in trade preferences formation, there are a number of non-economic elements that need to be taken into account, including ideology, cultural and social background as well as demographic characteristics.

Firstly, regarding individual's ideology, we consider the person's political affiliation. One would expect that those who define themselves as belonging to the left would be more likely to support protectionist policies than those who identify with the right (Daniels and Ruhr, 2005).

A second element to consider is the person's religious denomination. Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2002) argued that religious beliefs not necessarily affect their followers' attitudes towards the economic system "through literal messages found in sacred texts or in statements by religious leaders", but rather that they affect attitudes as a "low-frequency variable" based on teachings and conditioned by the cultural background. Moreover, they argue that attitudes towards trade with "others" and accepting "others" differ between religious denominations. In their study for the United States, they find that Catholics, Baptists and Methodists are more likely to support trade restrictions, than those with no religious affiliation.

Additionally, O'Rourke et al. (2001) state that values, attachments, and national identity play an important role in trade-policy preferences, due to the fact that such elements could translate into feelings of national superiority and antagonistic attitudes towards foreign products.

In this respect, there are different degrees of attachments to one's country, which defines the differences between patriotism, nationalism and chauvinism. Patriotism is the genuine feeling of attachment to one's country, while nationalism implies a greater devotion for one's country placing it above others: chauvinism is an extreme form of nationalism characterised by a feeling of superiority in regard to other nations (Mayda et al., 2001).

Even when these three concepts are linked to national pride, they are clearly different. National pride and patriotism coexist, while nationalism goes far beyond national pride. Indeed, the latter is a prerequisite to the former. Thus, there is no contradiction between feelings such as national pride and cosmopolitism, while nationalism and cosmopolitism are in essence contradictory (Smith et al., 1999). In consequence, patriotism is not contradictory to supporting free trade, while in the case of nationalism the relationship is ambiguous. It will depend on the person's intake on the consequences of free trade. If the persons sees free trade as a positive-sum game, and therefore accepts that trade implies benefits for the country as a whole, one would expect "patriots" (those who care for the country as a whole and not consider distributive effects) to favour free trade; however, if the person perceives trade as a zero-sum game in which some nations win and others lose or if they consider that the social consequences could be adverse, they would be likely to support trade restrictions. Finally, those who consider their country better than others are more likely to prefer their country's isolation and therefore, would support import-restrictive policies (Mayda et al., 2001).

Additionally, Mayda et al. (2001) concluded that the variables that mostly influence preference formation are social status, relative income, values and attachments. In the particular case of

income the find that it is the scale in which people place themselves that influences preferences rather than absolute income. They find that those who consider themselves as "richer" tend to favour trade more than those who see themselves as "poorer". In regard to attachments, they find that those who feel closer to their neighbourhood, community, country or who define themselves as nationalists tend to be more protectionists.

Finally, there are many demographic variables that are relevant to explain trade policy preferences. For example, in regard to age and gender, pervious empirical studies show the elderly are more likely to support import-restrictive policies than younger people. The same can be said for women in comparison to men. Additionally, some empirical studies find that married people are also more likely to support trade restrictions.

2. The data.

The data source is the module on National Identity of the 2003 ISSP's survey. In Uruguay the survey was carried out by the Department of Economics (dECON) of the School of Social Sciences of UDELAR in cooperation with the Institute of Statistics of the School of Economics of UDELAR, in the context of the ISSP program[2]. The fieldwork for this survey was carried out in August of 2004 by the team of conduct and opinion studies of dECON and the University of Pennsylvania financed it[3].

The survey asks respondents (approximately 1400 in each country) their opinions on a great variety of issues, including trade preferences, immigration, patriotism, and politics, as well as demographic and socio-economic information, such as age, gender, education, religiosity, political party, and others.

The question used in the survey to identify the respondent's trade preferences is:

[2] For a more detailed description of ISSP, see Annex.
[3] The dECON team thanks Professor Frank Furstenberg and the University of Pennsylvania whose financial support made possible the execution of the ISSP's Citizenship and National Identity's surveys in Uruguay.

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statement:

"respondent's country" should limit the import of foreign products

in order to protect its national economy?.

It could be argued that the last part of the question ("in order to protect its national economy") causes a bias in favour of protectionism, given that it implies that limiting imports is a way of protecting the economy and therefore, something positive. However, there are two arguments that partially cancel out this critic. Firstly, this is the usual speech used to defend protectionists politics and therefore they are the usual terms used to discuss the matter, and thus the question would not induce necessarily the person to answer in a particular way. And secondly, the goal in this paper is to analyse the relationship between this variable and others and not estimate the absolute level of support for protectionism, and thus it is less vulnerable to this type of bias (O'Rrourke et al., 2001).

Answers by country.

Insert table 1

Statistical description of the variables included in the model.

Insert table 2

3. The model.

The model aims at determining how different individual characteristics affect the formation of favourable opinions towards protectionism. In this respect, we estimated an ordered probit model[4].

The dependent variable seeks to grasp citizens's opinions on protectionism and it is defined as follow: Protec = *"respondent's country" should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect*

[4] For this estimation we use the oprobit command in Stata version 8.

its national economy: 1 being agree or agree strongly, 2 being neither agree nor disagree and 3 being disagree or disagree strongly.

The independent variables included in the model are:

1. Variable that reflects human capital.

   Educ = level of education: educ2 (1 if above lowest qualification and 0 other cases), educ3 (1 if higher secondary completed and 0 other cases), educ4 (1 if above higher secondary level and 0 other cases), and educ5 (1 if university degree completed and 0 other cases).

2. Variable reflecting income or social status.

   Topbot = self-placement in a scale of income from 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest).

3. Variables related to patriotism, nationalism and chauvinism.

   Natattachment = *how close do you feel to "respondent's country"*: 1 being close or very close and 0 other cases.

   Natpride = *I would rather be a citizen of "respondent's country" than of any other country in the world:* 1 being agree or agree strongly and 0 other cases.

   Natsup = *generally speaking, "respondent's country" is a better country than most other countries:* 1 being agree or agree strongly and 0 other cases.

   Natpride2 = *"respondent's country" should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflicts with other nations*: 1 being agree or agree strongly and 0 other cases.

4. Variables related with ideology and religion.

   Right = 1 if identifying with the right and 0 other cases.

   Religion = 1 if the person attends religious services every week or more and 0 other cases.

5. Variables that reflect national pride for particular characteristics of the country. *How proud are you of "respondent's country" in each of the following?*

   Dempride = *the way democracy works*: 1 being very proud or somewhat proud and 0 in other cases.

   Econpride = *economic achievements*: 1being very proud or somewhat proud and 0 other cases.

6. Variables reflecting employment status.

   Union = 1 if belonging to a trade union and 0 other cases.

7. Other socio-demographic variables considered.

   Married = first variable on marital state: 1 if married or living as married and 0 other cases.

   Single = second variable on marital state: 1 if single or 0 other cases.

   Gender = gender: 1 being a woman and 0 being a man.

   Age = age group: age02 (31-40 years old), age03 (41-50 years old), age04 (51-65 years old) and age05 (66 years old or older).

The phenomenon we are trying to model is discrete, the unobserved or latent variable is y* (degree of support to protectionism from foreign products) which is related to the independent observed variables (x_i).

$$y_i^* = x_i b + e_i$$

The variable y* is divided in three ordered categories:

$$y_i = m \; si \; t_{m-1} \leq y_i^* \leq t_m$$

Where: m 1, 2, 3 and $t_1 \, y \, t_2$ are estimated.

The observed categories are related to the latent variable in the following way:

$$y_i = \begin{cases} 1 \quad si \quad -\infty \le y_i^* < t_1 \\ 2 \quad si \quad t_1 \le y_i^* < t_2 \\ 3 \quad si \quad t_2 \le y_i^* < \infty \end{cases}$$

For example, for a given value of x, the probability of neither being protectionist nor not protectionist (y=2) corresponds to the region of the distribution where y* falls between t_1 *y* t_2 :

$$\Pr(y = 2|x) = \Pr(t_1 \le y_1^* < t_2|x)$$

The standard formula for this probability in ordinal models is:

$$\Pr(y = 2|x) = F(t_2 - xb) - F(t_1 - xb)$$

Assuming that F(.) is a normal distribution (with error variance 1), the estimation models used are ordered probit models.

The estimated parameters in ordered probit models do not provide direct information on the relationship between the independent and dependent variables (Long, 2001). Substantive interpretations are usually based in the prediction of probabilities and functions of these probabilities[5]. These predictions are made for different groups of individuals and the marginal effects of the independent variables are calculated[6].

4. Results.

Model estimated.

Insert table 3

In general, our results are the expected according to the theoretical framework and previous empirical studies. Firstly, the degree of religiosity (measured by weekly attendance to religious

[5] Programs designed by J. Scott Long and Jeremy Freese (2001) are used in these calculations.

services) has a significant and positive coefficient, which implies that religious people are more likely to support import-restrictive policies than the rest.

Additionally, political options as well as trade union membership are determinants of trade preferences. Those who identify with the right are less likely to support protectionism, while trade union membership affects preferences in the opposite direction.

Relative economic status also affects trade preferences significantly: individuals who place themselves higher in the income scale tend to be less protectionists, than those who place themselves lower in the scale.

On the other hand, higher levels of education have a negative coefficient in the estimated model, which means that those with higher education are less likely to support protectionist policies. Given that our sample includes both developed and developing countries, we cannot yet conclude if this result supports or not the H-O model, which we will do in below.

Regarding, socio-demographic variables the result shows that gender is significant in preference formation, indicating that women tend to be more protectionist than men. Four dummy variables representing different age groups were included but only the last one (65-year-olds o older) has a significant positive coefficient; therefore elderly people tend to be more protectionist. Regarding marital status, none of the included variables had significant coefficients.

And finally, feelings related to patriotism and nationalism affect preferences as expected. Feelings of attachment to one's country are not significant, which indicates that patriotism is not contradictory with non-protectionist preferences. On the other hand, strong feelings of national pride and national superiority are correlated with protectionist preferences. Additionally, while pride for the country's

[6] If the independent variable is binary, the marginal effect is the change from not having a particular characteristic to having it.

democratic system and achievements in sports have significant coefficients (with opposite signs), pride in economic achievements does not.

5. Conclusions.

Our first conclusion is that those with higher levels of education are less likely to support import-restrictive policies. Moreover, this result is found in all the countries in our sample, both developed and developing countries.

Therefore, it does not support the conclusions of the H-O model: the result is consistent with this model in the case of developed countries but not for developing countries, given that according to this model skilled workers in developing countries should be more likely to support protectionism. In consequence, in the case of developing countries the rationality behind these preferences reflects a different perception of the impact of free trade than the one predicated by the H-O model.

Consequently, this empirical fact is showing three possible open questions to further investigations: a) people take into account a short time horizon when forming these preferences or when evaluating this politics, b) the formation of this preferences could originated somewhere else than factor endowment or c) if a long-run perspective is accepted, it may reflect a different perception of the impact of free trade than the one predicated by the H-O model.

We find that non-economic characteristics such as national pride, feelings of national superiority, religiosity, political affiliation, among others, have a great impact on trade policy preferences.

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Annex - Tables

TABLE 1

Protec

country	NoProtec	Not know	Protec	Total
australia (au)	304	407	1,387	2,098
	14.49	19.40	66.11	100.00
austria (at)	224	169	561	954
	23.48	17.71	58.81	100.00
bulgaria (bg)	109	114	722	945
	11.53	12.06	76.40	100.00
canada (ca)	305	260	597	1,162
	26.25	22.38	51.38	100.00
chile (cl)	306	205	889	1,400
	21.86	14.64	63.50	100.00
czech republic (cz)	321	263	599	1,183
	27.13	22.23	50.63	100.00
denmark (dk)	592	202	438	1,232
	48.05	16.40	35.55	100.00
finland (fi)	485	348	430	1,263
	38.40	27.55	34.05	100.00
france (fr)	439	323	816	1,578
	27.82	20.47	51.71	100.00
germany-west (dee)	275	175	345	795
	34.59	22.01	43.40	100.00
germany-east (dew)	123	98	189	410
	30.00	23.90	46.10	100.00
great britain (gb)	136	204	498	838
	16.23	24.34	59.43	100.00

hungary (hu)	129	208	633	970
	13.30	21.44	65.26	100.00
ireland (ie)	288	153	601	1,042
	27.64	14.68	57.68	100.00
israel jews (ilj)	261	154	622	1,037
	25.17	14.85	59.98	100.00
israel arabs (ila)	5	22	122	149
	3.36	14.77	81.88	100.00
japan (jp)	291	315	418	1,024
	28.42	30.76	40.82	100.00
latvia (lv)	156	169	656	981
	15.90	17.23	66.87	100.00
new zealand (nz)	212	216	568	996
	21.29	21.69	57.03	100.00
norway (no)	503	394	486	1,383
	36.37	28.49	35.14	100.00
philippines (ph)	137	185	858	1,180
	11.61	15.68	72.71	100.00
poland (pl)	148	194	877	1,219
	12.14	15.91	71.94	100.00
portugal (pt)	301	203	890	1,394
	21.59	14.56	63.85	100.00
russia (ru)	447	358	1,407	2,212
	20.21	16.18	63.61	100.00
slovak repub. (sk)	110	284	758	1,152
	9.55	24.65	65.80	100.00
slovenia (si)	299	198	559	1,056
	28.31	18.75	52.94	100.00

south africa (za)	386	215	1,548	2,149
	17.96	10.00	72.03	100.00
south korea (kr)	320	294	681	1,295
	24.71	22.70	52.59	100.00
spain (es)	170	299	690	1,159
	14.67	25.80	59.53	100.00
sweden (se)	389	394	319	1,102
	35.30	35.75	28.95	100.00
switzerland (ch)	443	203	375	1,021
	43.39	19.88	36.73	100.00
united states (us)	203	253	724	1,180
	17.20	21.44	61.36	100.00
uruguay (uy)	136	146	767	1,049
	12.96	13.92	73.12	100.00
venezuela (ve)	373	7	764	1,144
	32.60	0.61	66.78	100.00
Total	9,944	7,994	23,732	41,670
	23.86	19.18	56.95	100.00

TABLE 2

Description

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
protec	39752	2.338801	.8326111	1	3
gender	42119	.5477338	.4977222	0	1
age02	42154	.1926982	.3944227	0	1
age03	42154	.1894245	.3918501	0	1
age04	42154	.2290649	.4202361	0	1
age05	42154	.1578261	.3645822	0	1
married	41831	.5713944	.4948825	0	1
single	41831	.2592575	.4382324	0	1
educ2	42154	.2111069	.4080989	0	1
educ3	42154	.2213076	.4151321	0	1
educ4	42154	.1576126	.3643817	0	1
educ5	42154	.1526783	.3596814	0	1
topbot	40492	4.765114	2.276806	0	10
religion	42154	.1828296	.3865314	0	1
right	42154	.1992456	.3994378	0	1
union	42154	.1822603	.3860635	0	1
natattachment	41295	.8860879	.3177083	0	1
natpride	40936	.763118	.4251745	0	1
natsup	40084	.5397914	.4984203	0	1
natpride2	39470	.5259184	.4993341	0	1
dempride	39081	.5402625	.4983827	0	1
econpride	38823	.525642	.4993485	0	1
au	42154	.0517863	.2215979	0	1
at	42154	.0238649	.1526299	0	1
bg	42154	.0253594	.157216	0	1
ca	42154	.028728	.167043	0	1
ch	42154	.0246003	.1549054	0	1
cl	42154	.0357024	.1855494	0	1
cz	42154	.03027	.1713312	0	1
de	42154	.0305309	.172045	0	1
dk	42154	.0313612	.174294	0	1

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          es |     42154    .0287517    .1671099          0          1
          fi |     42154    .0327134    .1778875          0          1
          fr |     42154    .0395929    .1950031          0          1
          gb |     42154    .0207098    .1424127          0          1
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------
          hu |     42154    .0242207    .1537356          0          1
          ie |     42154    .0252645    .1569293          0          1
          il |     42154    .0288941    .1675108          0          1
          jp |     42154    .0261422    .1595601          0          1
          kr |     42154    .0311951    .1738468          0          1
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------
          lv |     42154    .0237225    .1521852          0          1
          no |     42154    .0348484    .1833979          0          1
          nz |     42154    .0245766    .1548325          0          1
          ph |     42154     .028467    .1663049          0          1
          pl |     42154    .0302937    .1713963          0          1
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------
          pt |     42154    .0380035     .191207          0          1
          ru |     42154    .0565308    .2309466          0          1
          sk |     42154    .0273284    .1630404          0          1
          si |     42154    .0259287    .1589246          0          1
          se |     42154    .0281349    .1653602          0          1
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------
          uy |     42154    .0262846    .1599822          0          1
          us |     42154    .0288466    .1673773          0          1
          ve |     42154    .0284433    .1662377          0          1
          za |     42154    .0589031     .235446          0          1
```

TABLE 3

The model

Ordered probit estimates — Number of obs = 32563
Wald chi2(22) = .
Prob > chi2 = .
Log pseudo-likelihood = -29268.672 — Pseudo R2 = 0.0788

(standard errors adjusted for clustering on v3)

protec	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf.	Interval]
gender	.1639137	.0280196	5.85	0.000	.1089964	.2188311
age02	-.0118787	.0230889	-0.51	0.607	-.0571321	.0333747
age03	-.0424644	.0303803	-1.40	0.162	-.1020088	.0170799
age04	-.0086167	.0367281	-0.23	0.815	-.0806025	.0633691
age05	.1035728	.0440241	2.35	0.019	.0172872	.1898584
married	.0062716	.0256445	0.24	0.807	-.0439908	.0565339
single	-.0312624	.0392689	-0.80	0.426	-.1082281	.0457033
educ2	-.0511611	.0219495	-2.33	0.020	-.0941813	-.0081409
educ3	-.1829222	.0360218	-5.08	0.000	-.2535236	-.1123207
educ4	-.268734	.0456773	-5.88	0.000	-.35826	-.1792081
educ5	-.5415588	.0489726	-11.06	0.000	-.6375434	-.4455742
topbot	-.0219789	.0067348	-3.26	0.001	-.0351788	-.008779
religion	.1050106	.0309048	3.40	0.001	.0444384	.1655828
right	-.0594116	.0327859	-1.81	0.070	-.1236708	.0048476
union	.0387291	.0294215	1.32	0.188	-.018936	.0963941
natattachment	.0037702	.0355842	0.11	0.916	-.0659734	.0735139
natpride	.2845356	.025982	10.95	0.000	.2336119	.3354593
natsup	.155382	.0213334	7.28	0.000	.1135693	.1971946
natpride2	.3688221	.03479	10.60	0.000	.300635	.4370093
dempride	-.0155943	.0283833	-0.55	0.583	-.0712245	.040036
econpride	-.041981	.0168992	-2.48	0.013	-.0751028	-.0088593
au	-.2835989	.0228467	-12.41	0.000	-.3283776	-.2388201
at	-.6638312	.0287634	-23.08	0.000	-.7202065	-.6074559
bg	-.2236531	.02575	-8.69	0.000	-.2741221	-.173184
ca	-.6511304	.0225454	-28.88	0.000	-.6953185	-.6069422
ch	-1.048792	.0205626	-51.00	0.000	-1.089094	-1.00849
cl	-.6485154	.0260566	-24.89	0.000	-.6995853	-.5974454
cz	-.7327339	.0251129	-29.18	0.000	-.7819543	-.6835136
dk	-1.236441	.0272083	-45.44	0.000	-1.289768	-1.183113

```
          es |  -.4954643   .0231994   -21.36   0.000    -.5409342   -.4499944
          fi |  -1.220128   .0254431   -47.96   0.000    -1.269995   -1.170261
          fr |  -.6493681   .0170323   -38.13   0.000    -.6827508   -.6159853
          gb |  -.5588491   .0369474   -15.13   0.000    -.6312646   -.4864336
          hu |  -.3990947   .0230037   -17.35   0.000    -.4441811   -.3540082
          ie |  -.6518386   .0307082   -21.23   0.000    -.7120255   -.5916516
          jp |  -.7983197   .0220617   -36.19   0.000    -.8415599   -.7550795
          kr |  -.6311631   .0186347   -33.87   0.000    -.6676865   -.5946397
          no |  -.8987523   .0204703   -43.91   0.000    -.9388734   -.8586312
          nz |   -.720902   .0292969   -24.61   0.000    -.7783229   -.6634811
          ph |    -.16058   .0247265    -6.49   0.000     -.209043    -.112117
          pl |  -.2328206   .0249447    -9.33   0.000    -.2817113   -.1839298
          pt |  -.6248742   .0301103   -20.75   0.000    -.6838894   -.5658591
          ru |  -.5273699   .0228229   -23.11   0.000    -.5721019   -.4826379
          sk |   -.160967   .0219403    -7.34   0.000    -.2039693   -.1179647
          si |  -.6500859    .024727   -26.29   0.000    -.6985499   -.6016219
          se |  -1.062271      .0252   -42.15   0.000    -1.111662   -1.012879
          uy |   -.337899   .0264638   -12.77   0.000    -.3897671    -.286031
          us |  -.3872473   .0289399   -13.38   0.000    -.4439684   -.3305262
          ve |  -.7076662   .0352883   -20.05   0.000      -.77683   -.6385024
          za |  -.5119134   .0463063   -11.05   0.000    -.6026721   -.4211546
          de |  -.9228742   .0429174   -21.50   0.000    -1.006991   -.8387578
          il |  -.4724001   .1440516    -3.28   0.001    -.7547361    -.190064
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
       _cut1 |  -1.114213   .0649496          (Ancillary parameters)
       _cut2 |  -.5241387   .0612674
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```