

**DETERMINANTS OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION**

**AGREEMENTS IN A DISCRETE CHOICE**

**FRAMEWORK: RE-EXAMINING THE EVIDENCE**

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# Determinants of regional integration agreements in a discrete choice framework: re-examining the evidence

## **Abstract**

This paper provides new empirical evidence on the determinants of regional integration agreements (RIAs) in a discrete choice modelling framework. The research has two main aims: first, to empirically analyse the determinants of different levels of integration, re-examining the evidence presented by Baier and Bergstrand (2004) in the JIE 64 (1); and second, to analyse the importance of additional factors, in particular socio-political factors. The results show that geographical factors alone are the most important explanatory factors for the probability of regional integration agreement formation or enhancement, thus supporting the theories on “natural” trading partners. The socio-political factors considered, democracy dummy, the level of economic freedom and the common language dummy are all statistically significant, although their relative importance in explaining RIA formation is low.

*Keywords:* Regional integration agreements, discrete choice models, trade flows, natural partners

*JEL classification:* F11, F12, F15

## **1. Introduction**

A major concern in the traditional literature on the formation of free trade areas (FTAs) has been whether these areas generate welfare gains for the individual countries that engage in these processes. Since the 1950s (Viner, 1950) many authors have contributed to this debate, and especially in the 1990s, studies based on the gravity model proliferated (Frankel, Stein and Wei –FSW-, 1995, 1996, 1998). However, none of this research has attempted to evaluate the determinants of FTA formation.

Only recently have Baier and Bergstrand (2004) developed the first theoretical and empirical analysis of the economic determinants of FTA formation. They provide an economic benchmark for future political economy models to explain the determinants of FTAs. They find evidence showing that pairs of countries will be more likely to form FTAs if they share the following characteristics: a) they are geographically close to each

other, b) they are remote from the rest of the world, c) they are large and of similar economic size, d) the difference of capital-labour between them is large and e) the difference of their capital-labour ratios is small compared to the rest of the world. Baier and Bergstrand (BB) only consider whether or not each pair of countries is involved in an FTA. Therefore the variable they attempt to explain is binary and takes the values zero and one. Baier and Bergstrand (2005) show the importance of treating FTAs as endogenous when the determinants of trade flows are analysed. They show that when the endogeneity of the FTA variables is taken into account in gravity models, their effect on trade flows is quintupled.

We extend BB's work in two ways: firstly, we investigate the determinants of regional integration agreements (RIAs) rather than FTAs by considering five different levels of integration between pairs of countries: Preferential trade agreement (PTA), free trade agreement (FTA), customs union (CU), single market (SM) and monetary union (MU). Secondly, we address the importance of additional economic, geographical and socio-political variables as determinants of RIAs.

We begin by replicating the BB empirical work to verify the robustness of their results with an alternative data set. We then estimate an ordered logit model (instead of a binary probit) with the same explanatory variables considered by BB to benchmark our extension to their original work. Finally, the ordered logit is estimated with additional economic, geographical and socio-political variables. The economic variables we consider are economic size, income differences, factor endowment differences and trade barriers. Adjacency and landlocked status are added to BB's list of geographical variables. The socio-political variables are a shared language, political regime and level of economic freedom.

We find that: (i) BB's results are fairly robust, although with our data base the K-L difference variable shows a reversal of the coefficient signs; (ii) the additional characteristics considered have a significant impact on the probability of an RIA being formed; (iii) as BB stated, socio-political factors are less important than economic and geographical factors.

To our knowledge, Wu (2004) is the only author to have considered different levels of integration ranked across countries. However, her paper focuses on the role that political and economic uncertainty plays in explaining RIA formation and her results are not directly comparable to Baier and Bergstrand since she includes different explanatory variables in her model. Wu shows that countries' per capita income, democracy and geographical characteristics appear to be the best indicators of the probability of participation in a certain level of RIA in the period 1987-1998. Surprisingly, Wu (2004) does not consider the distance variable as a determinant of RIA formation. This omission may influence the results obtained for other variables, since the model is not well specified.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework and the econometric model. Section 3 describes the data, the variables and the hypothesis to be tested. Section 4 discusses the estimation results and Section 5 concludes.

## **2. Theoretical framework and econometric model**

### *2.1 The theory*

We take as our theoretical framework the Baier and Bergstrand (2004) model, which is a generalisation of the Krugman-FSW model. The model allows for asymmetries between countries and sectors and considers positive intra- and inter-continental transport costs.

The model assumes that consumers have a taste for variety and there are two monopolistic competitive sectors that produce with positive economies of scale. These assumptions give rise to international trade of goods. There are two factors, capital and labour, that are mobile between sectors, but not across countries. The asymmetries of regionalism are modelled by considering three continents with two countries in each of them. Each country may have different relative factor intensities, taste diversity and trade costs. The full model includes 204 equations and 204 endogenous variables.

Based on the theoretical model, the authors also compute a general equilibrium model to analyse the relative welfare gains of regionalism, with an emphasis on world geography.

Three categories of economic FTA determinants can be inferred from this theoretical framework: economic geography factors, intra-industry trade determinants and inter-industry trade determinants. These three factors and other socio-economic factors are considered in the empirical analysis.

## *2.2 Econometric model*

Probit and logit models have often been used to model discrete choice phenomena (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). In this context, a logit model is a discrete choice system, interpreted as a particular case of a model, the dependent variable of which is subject to limited variability, is not continuous and takes a finite number of values (McFadden and Train, 2000; Koppelman and Wen, 1998). This type of system describes the behaviour of economic agents in terms of probability. The probability of a specific selection is assigned to a series of explanatory values. This series of values gathers the characteristics of decision-makers and/or the attributes of the various choice alternatives.

Multinomial logit or probit models are used when there are more than two alternatives. However, they fail to account for the ordinal nature of the dependent variable used in this research. We aim to model the choice of sequential binary decisions, the first one consisting of a pair of countries that either sign a preferential trade agreement (PTA) or do not. Once a country has a bilateral agreement, the next decision will be whether to take a further step and go to a higher level of integration. Therefore, the model objective is to take a series of binary decisions, each one consisting of the decision of whether to accept the current value or “take one more”. In this context, Amemiya (1975) describes a model that applies to ordered discrete alternatives, such as the number of cars owned by a household. This is based on the assumption of local (as opposed to global) utility maximisation. The decision maker stops when the first local optimum is reached. Economic agents must choose between two sequential options, and their selection depends on their characteristics and their environment. In accordance with the characteristics of our dependent variable, an ordered logit model was specified in our study.

The model is built around a latent regression in the same way as the binomial probit model. An observed ordinal variable,  $Y$ , is a function of a unobserved latent variable,  $Y^*$ , which represents the difference in utility levels from an action. The continuous latent variable  $Y^*$  has a number of threshold points, and the value of the observed variable  $Y$  depends on whether or not a particular threshold is crossed. In the present analysis we assume that five different integration levels can be reached, therefore the number of thresholds is five,

$$Y_i = 0 \text{ if } Y^*_i = d_1$$

$$Y_i = 1 \text{ if } d_1 = Y^*_i = d_2$$

$$Y_i = 2 \text{ if } d_2 = Y^*_i = d_3 \tag{1}$$

$$Y_i = 3 \text{ if } d_3 = Y_i^* = d_4$$

$$Y_i = 4 \text{ if } d_4 = Y_i^* = d_5$$

$$Y_i = 5 \text{ if } Y_i^* = d_5$$

where the  $d$ s are unknown parameters to be estimated. Threshold 1 denotes that a pair of countries engages in a PTA, threshold 2 denotes a FTA, threshold 3 a CU, threshold 4 a SM and threshold 5 a MU.

The continuous latent variable is given by,

$$Y_i^* = \sum_{k=1}^k \beta_k X_{ki} + e_i = Z_i + e_i \quad (2)$$

where  $X_{ki}$  are the explanatory variables,  $\beta_k$  are the coefficients and  $e_i$  is the random disturbance term that is assumed to be independent of  $X$  and has a logistic distribution.

The ordered logit model estimates,

$$Z_i = \sum_{k=1}^k \beta_k X_{ki} = E(Y_i^*) \quad (3)$$

Once the  $\beta_k$  parameter and the  $M-1$   $d$ s have been estimated, they can be used to calculate the probability that  $Y$  will take on a particular value. For example, when  $M=6$ ,

$$\Pr(Y = 0) = \Pr(Z_i \leq 0) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(Z_i - d_1)}$$

$$\Pr(Y = 1) = \Pr(Z_i \leq d_1) - \Pr(Z_i \leq 0) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(Z_i - d_2)} - \frac{1}{1 + \exp(Z_i - d_1)} \quad (4)$$

$$\Pr(Y = 2) = \Pr(Z_i \leq d_2) - \Pr(Z_i \leq d_1) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(Z_i - d_3)} - \frac{1}{1 + \exp(Z_i - d_2)}$$

$$\Pr(Y = 3) = \Pr(\mathbf{Z}_i \leq \mathbf{d}_3) - \Pr(\mathbf{Z}_i \leq \mathbf{d}_2) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(\mathbf{Z}_i - \mathbf{d}_4)} - \frac{1}{1 + \exp(\mathbf{Z}_i - \mathbf{d}_3)}$$

$$\Pr(Y = 4) = \Pr(\mathbf{Z}_i \leq \mathbf{d}_4) - \Pr(\mathbf{Z}_i \leq \mathbf{d}_3) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(\mathbf{Z}_i - \mathbf{d}_5)} - \frac{1}{1 + \exp(\mathbf{Z}_i - \mathbf{d}_4)}$$

$$P(Y = 5) = \Pr(\mathbf{d}_5 \leq \mathbf{Z}_i) = 1 - \frac{1}{1 + \exp(\mathbf{Z}_i - \mathbf{d}_5)}$$

Hence, using the estimated value of  $Z$  and the assumed logistic distribution of the disturbance term, the ordered logit model can be used to estimate the probability that the unobserved variable  $Y^*$  falls within the various threshold limits.

The unknown coefficients and the thresholds can be estimated numerically by the maximum likelihood method, where the above probabilities are the elements of the likelihood function. The probability that a higher integration level is chosen increases if the  $\beta$ s are positive, and the corresponding explanatory variable increases. This can be seen by calculating the derivatives of the cumulative probabilities:

$$\frac{\partial \Pr(Y_i \leq M)}{\partial X_{ki}} = -\mathbf{b}_j \frac{\exp(\mathbf{Z}_i - \mathbf{d}_k)}{(1 + \exp(\mathbf{Z}_i - \mathbf{d}_k))^2} \quad (5)$$

Since the interpretation of the coefficients of this kind of model is unclear, a commonly used practice is to calculate the marginal effects associated with the probability of an RIA being formed or higher integration stages being established. They are given by:

$$\frac{\partial \Pr(Y_i = M)}{\partial X_{ki}} = -\mathbf{b}_j \left( \frac{\exp(\mathbf{Z}_i - \mathbf{d}_k)}{(1 + \exp(\mathbf{Z}_i - \mathbf{d}_k))^2} - \frac{\exp(\mathbf{Z}_i - \mathbf{d}_{k-1})}{(1 + \exp(\mathbf{Z}_i - \mathbf{d}_{k-1}))^2} \right) \quad (6)$$

An advantage of an ordered logit over an ordered probit model is its simplicity. However, it is subject to the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) property, which constitutes a tight limitation, as all alternatives must follow an independent choice function. Selection pairs  $P_i/P_j$  of alternative  $i$  over  $j$  are independent on whether third alternatives exist. The advantage of this condition is that it enables the introduction of new alternatives –such as new integration levels- with no need to re-estimate the model. The difference between the estimated parameters must be the same, regardless of the number of alternatives the economic agent faces. The disadvantage of this property is that alternatives must be perceived as distinct and independent.

The evaluation of this type of model differs in certain ways from traditional models. Even though the ratio of an estimated coefficient to its corresponding estimated standard error follows a t-Student distribution, the F test is not appropriate for these models. The most commonly accepted test is the Pseudo- $R^2$ , a scalar measure of the explanatory power of the model, derived from the maximum likelihood ratio<sup>1</sup>. This test is defined as:

$$r^2 = 1 - \frac{\log L_u}{\log L_c} \quad (7)$$

Where:  $L_u$  = likelihood function of the model with explanatory variables.

$L_c$  = likelihood function of the model without explanatory variables and only one constant.

$r^2$  lies between zero and one, and equals 1 when the model is a perfect predictor:

$$P_i = F(X_i \mathbf{b}) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } Y_i = 1 \\ 0 & \text{if } Y_i = 0 \end{cases} \quad (8)$$

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<sup>1</sup>Also known as likelihood ratio index (LRI).

$P$  takes value 0 if  $\log L_\epsilon = \log L_u$ , thus  $r^2$  increases to 1 when  $\log L_\epsilon$  rises in relation to  $\log L_u$ .

An alternative way to evaluate the goodness of fit of an ordered logit is to calculate the exp (log likelihood / number of observations) which is the geometric average of  $P(O_j / X_j, \text{ estimates})$ , where  $O_j$  and  $X_j$  are the outcome and the explanatory variables for observation  $j$ . This ratio shows the probability of obtaining a certain outcome conditional on the estimates. The higher the ratio is, the greater the explanatory power of the model will be.

The interpretation of coefficients in an ordered logit model also differs explicitly from other models. In discrete choice logit and probit models, the sign of the coefficients denotes the direction of switch, but its magnitude is difficult to interpret. For example, in the ordered logit model estimated in this paper, positive coefficients corresponding to characteristics of the individuals increase the probability that a pair of countries will be observed in a higher integration category, whereas negative coefficients increase the probability that a pair of countries will be observed in a lower integration category.

### **3. Data, hypothesis and variables**

#### *3.1 The data*

The model is estimated with 1999 data for 66 countries representing over 75% of world trade (see Table A.1, Appendix A). Data on income are obtained from the World Development Indicators (2001). Distances are the great circle distances between economic centres. Data on capital labour ratios are obtained from the Penn World Tables. Data on bilateral exports are obtained from Statistics Canada (2001), and tariff barriers from the World Bank website. Information about geographical and language dummies is from the CIA (2003). The Economic Freedom index was obtained from the Heritage Foundation, and the political regime, from the Freedom House. Table A.2 in

Appendix A presents a more detailed description of data and sources. Finally, the agreements considered to build the depended variable are listed in Table A.3 (Appendix A).

### *3.2. Hypothesis and variables*

According to the underlying theory described in Section 2 above and in the context of the discrete choice model, our first hypothesis is that a pair of countries will be more likely to form an RIA when the distance between them is small. We specify the distance variable as in BB. This variable is called “natural” as it is defined as the logarithm of the inverse of distance between trading partners.

A second hypothesis is that the probability of RIA formation increases as the remoteness of a country or pair of countries from the rest of the world rises. For comparative purposes, we construct the same remoteness variable used by BB. When a country is relatively far from its trading partners, it tends to trade more bilaterally with its neighbours, thereby increasing the probability of RIA formation.

The third hypothesis is that the larger the economic size of the trading countries, the greater the probability of RIA formation will be.  $RGDP_{ij}$  measures the sum of the logs of real GDPs of countries  $i$  and  $j$  in 1960<sup>2</sup>.

The fourth hypothesis is that the more similar in economic size the countries are, the higher the probability of RIA formation will be.  $DRGDP_{ij}$  is the absolute value of the difference between the logs of real GDPs of countries  $i$  and  $j$  in 1960.

The fifth hypothesis is that the larger the economic size of countries outside the RIA, the higher the probability of RIA formation will be. However, the size of the rest of the world (ROW) measured by the ROW GDP varies only slightly in a cross-section of

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<sup>2</sup> Data are from 1960 to avoid problems derived from the endogeneity of income in the estimated equation. The same applies to the variables  $DRGDP_{ij}$  and  $DKL_{ij}$ .

countries and has not been included in the regression. BB obtained a non-significant coefficient for this variable.

The sixth hypothesis is that the probability that a pair of countries will form an RIA is higher if they have a larger difference in relative factor endowments, since traditional comparative advantages will be further exploited. However, if intercontinental transport costs are low, this probability may also decrease at high levels of specialisation. This can be modelled by adding a quadratic term to the estimated equation. We use absolute differences in the capital stock per worker ratio ( $DKL_{ij}$ ) as a proxy for relative factor endowment differences, as in BB<sup>3</sup>.  $SQDKL_{ij}$  denotes squared  $DKL_{ij}$ .

The first model estimated is a binary probit where the dependent variable takes the value of one when the countries have an integration agreement, zero otherwise, and the independent variables are those listed above.

The second model estimated is an ordered logit. Five possible different levels of integration between pairs of countries are considered to investigate the determinants of regional integration agreements (RIAs). In this context, supplementary economic, geographical and socio-political variables are added as determinants of RIAs. Tariff barriers and bilateral trade flows were initially added as economic variables. Trade barriers were expected to have a negative sign, since a higher level of protection can be an obstacle to a higher integration level being reached. Trade flows were expected to have a positive sign, since more trade between countries indicates a strong relationship and dependence and a reason to sign an RIA. However, due to the endogeneity problems found for bilateral trade, we chose to exclude this variable from the estimations. Magee (2003) provides one of the first assessments of the hypothesis that two countries are more likely to form a PTA if they are already major trading partners.

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<sup>3</sup> Data are for 1965 rather than 1960, since data on capital labour ratios is only available from 1965 onwards in the Penn World Tables data series. Baier and Bergstrand (2004) use data for 1960.

He estimates a probit and a non-linear two-stage least squares model that considers trade flows as endogenous in the second specification. Magee's results show that in every specification of the model, greater bilateral trade flows significantly increase the likelihood that countries will form a preferential trade agreement.

Landlocked status and adjacency are added to the list of geographical variables used by BB. Adjacency is expected to have a positive sign, whereas being landlocked could have a positive or a negative sign. On the one hand, a landlocked country has greater incentives to eliminate trade restrictions with neighbours, especially with non-landlocked countries. On the other hand, when a landlocked country trades with partners located in another continent (unnatural partner), it will have higher transport costs than a coastal country.

Finally, the socio-political variables are: sharing a common language, the political regime (this variable takes a value of 1 when the political regime is a democracy) and the level of economic freedom. The economic freedom variable takes a value between 1-1.99 for free countries, 2-2.99 for mostly free countries, 3-3.99 for mostly non-free countries and 4-4.99 for repressed countries. Language and democracy dummies are expected to have a positive sign, whereas economic freedom is expected to have negative coefficients<sup>4</sup>.

## **4. Estimation Results**

### *4.1 Probit estimation*

The results obtained when a binary probit is estimated are shown in Table 1. The results will be comparable to those obtained by BB<sup>5</sup> although the sample of

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<sup>4</sup> Note that according to the definition of these variables, higher values imply lower economic freedom.

<sup>5</sup> Table B.1 in Appendix B.

countries considered is not exactly the same, the year is 1999 instead of 1996, and the definition of the dependent variable also varies slightly.

*Table 1. Probit results for the probability of RIA formation or enhancement*

The first hypothesis to be tested is that the smaller the distance between the two countries, the more likely their social planners will be to form an RIA, since the closer two trading partners are, the lower their trade barriers will be. The probability of establishing an RIA increases with diminishing distances between the trading countries. BB obtain a positive coefficient (1.74) in their equivalent Model 1. We also obtain a positive coefficient (0.56), but it is lower in magnitude.

In Model 2, the second hypothesis is tested. For a given distance between two countries, the more remote the two continental trading partners are from the rest of the world, the more likely they will be to form an RIA. We calculate this variable according to BB and we obtain a positive coefficient similar in magnitude.

In Model 3, the third hypothesis is that the larger the trading partners are in economic terms, the greater the probability of an RIA being formed will be. This effect is captured by  $RGDP_{ij}$  and it is positive and significant, as expected. However, the coefficient obtained in this paper is lower than that obtained in BB.

In Model 4, the fourth hypothesis is tested. The greater the similarity between the economic size of the two countries, the higher the probability of an RIA being established will be. This effect is captured by  $DRGDP_{ij}$ . We obtain the expected negative sign and this variable is significant.

Finally, the sixth hypothesis is tested in Models 5, 6 and 7. According to BB, the larger the difference between countries' relative factor endowments, the greater the probability of FTA formation will be, although this may only be true to a limited extent. The variables  $DKL_{ij}$  and  $SQDKL_{ij}$  ( $DKL_{ij}$  squared) measure this effect. When we include

these two variables in the same regression, they are not significant. Since the two variables are highly correlated, DKLij and SQDKLij are included in Models 5 and 7 respectively. Both variables are significant, but they do not have the expected signs. The negative sign obtained for DKLij indicates that the larger the difference between countries' relative factor endowments is, the lower the probability of an RIA will be. This result indicates that the social planners from the two countries tend to form an RIA when they have similar relative factor endowments. Accordingly, higher levels of intra-industry trade will be desirable if RIAs are to be formed, since countries with similar endowments trade similar commodities. This does not support the notion of "natural trading partners" defined by Schiff (1999) as complementarities between partners (one country tends to import what the other exports). A plausible explanation from the demand side may be that because countries with similar endowments have similar tastes and love variety, their governments will be more likely to negotiate higher levels of integration.

BB test an additional hypothesis. The higher the absolute difference between the relative factor endowment of the member countries and the relative factor endowment of the rest of the world, the lower the probability of FTA formation will be, due to potential trade diversion. We construct DROWKLij according to BB, although we aggregate the ratio K/L rather than aggregating both variables separately<sup>6</sup>, since we do not have detached data for capital and labour. We use equation (9) to calculate DROWKLij.

<sup>6</sup> Baier and Bergstrand (2004) measure DROWKLij as:

$$DROWKLij = \frac{\left| \log \left[ \frac{\sum_{k=1, k \neq j}^N K_k}{\sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N L_k} \right] - \log [K_i / L_i] \right| + \left| \log \left[ \frac{\sum_{k=1, k \neq j}^N K_k}{\sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N L_k} \right] - \log [K_j / L_j] \right|}{2}$$

$$DROWKLij = \frac{\left\{ \log \left[ \sum_{k=1, k \neq i}^N [K_k / L_k] \right] - \log [K_i / L_i] + \log \left[ \sum_{k=1, k \neq j}^N [K_k / L_k] \right] - \log [K_j / L_j] \right\}}{2} \quad (9)$$

The coefficient of this variable is close to zero (0.05) and is not significant.

Differences in the two sets of results can be explained by the different constructions of the dependent variable: BB consider only full FTAs or customs unions, whereas our dependent variable includes all PTAs, FTAs, CUs, SMs and MUs notified to GATT/WTO under Article XXIV and under the Enabling Clause (see Table A.3, Appendix A). This variable is broader since it regards integration agreements as a process with different levels of integration; with this construction it make sense to estimate an ordered logit.

BB use the Pseudo R2, calculated according to equation (7) above, as a measure of explanatory power. However, Heinen (1993) points out that although this index is not affected by changes in the sample size, it is affected by the presence of missing observations. In this case, a better alternative is to calculate McFadden's R2, which takes the missing values into account. Table 1 shows both the Pseudo R2 and the McFadden's R2. The McFadden statistic considers that there is a different number of observations in the restricted and unrestricted models when there are missing values for some variables. In the estimated models 3-7, the McFadden's R2 is preferred to the Pseudo R2 since there are zero values in some of the explanatory variables.

#### 4.2 Ordered logit estimation

We estimate an ordered logit model consisting of a system of 5 equations, with common coefficients for all the explanatory variables and with different constant terms. This is known as the proportional odds model.

In the first column of Table 2 (Model 8), an ordered logit is estimated with the same variables included in Model 5 (probit estimation). Model 9 to Model 12 in columns 2 to 6 of Table 2 are estimated for different sets of variables grouped as economic, geographical and socio-political variables. This sequential analysis enables us to find out the most important factors in promoting RIAs.

*Table 2. Ordered logit results for the probability of RIA formation or enhancement*

Model 8 shows that the results are similar in both probit and ordered logit models, although the logit ordered coefficients are higher in magnitude. In general terms, we can state that the probability of reaching a higher level of integration is higher than the probability of signing any type of RIA when no previous agreement exists between the trading countries. However, as stated above, there is no consensus on the interpretation of the magnitude of the coefficients estimated in discrete choice models.

Model 9 shows the results obtained when only economic variables are included in the analysis. The coefficient on tariffs is negative, thus showing that a higher level of protection decreases the probability of RIA enhancement.

Models 10 and 11 in Table 2 show the results for the geographical variables. All geographical variables are significant at 1%, and natural, remoteness and adjacency have a positive signed coefficient, while the landlocked variable coefficient is negative. In Model 11 the interaction variable (landlocked\*remoteness) is added to consider the ambiguous sign expected for the landlocked variable. The estimated coefficient shows a positive sign, indicating that the probability of reaching a higher level of integration increases for more remote continental trading partners when one of them is landlocked.

Model 12, in the last column of Table 2, shows that all the socio-political variables are significant: democracy, the level of economic freedom and the common language promote RIA enhancement. However, in terms of goodness of fit, the Pseudo R2 is very low (0.04).

The AIC shows that the best specification is the one estimated in Model 8, where economic and geographical variables are considered. For the specification where only geographical variables are considered, the AIC is lower (1.542) than that obtained in regressions including only economic (1.914) or only socio-political factors (1.762). This appears to indicate that geographical variables are the most important determinants of RIA formation.

We would have preferred the ideal specification of the model to simultaneously include all the significant variables: economic, geographical and socio-political variables. However, problems related to the correlation between the explanatory variables prevented us from doing this.

As stated above, the interpretation of the coefficients in an ordered logit does not inform on the magnitude of switch, since we can only state that positive coefficients increase the likelihood that the country pairs will be observed in a higher category, and negative coefficients increase the likelihood the country pairs will be observed in a lower category. A preferable interpretation of the ordered logit coefficients is in terms of the odd ratios. The exponentiated coefficients in logit, shown in Table 3, can be interpreted as odds ratios for a 1-unit change in the corresponding variable. The emphasis is on the ratio “ $\text{Exp}(\beta)$ ”, which is the odds conditional on  $x+1$  divided by the odds conditional on  $x$ . For example, 1.19 means that the odds of being in a higher integration level increase 1.19 if RGDP increases by 1. The interpretation can also be made in terms of percentages: the  $\text{exp}(1.49)$  obtained in the “natural” variable in Model 8 means the odds

increase by 346%  $\{\exp(1.49)-1\} \times 100$  if the variable increases by 1, therefore the odds of being part of the monetary union versus lower integration levels is 346% higher for a one-unit increase in the “natural” variable. Table 3 shows that the most important determinant of an RIA is the “natural” variable, followed by remoteness (1.37), real GDP (1.19), real GDP differences (0.84) and K/L differences (0.77).

We also calculate semi-standardised ordered logit coefficients that control for the metric of the independent variables, to see whether any change occurs in the ordering of the effects. The option of standardised coefficients to measure the relative strength of the effects of the independent variables is more appropriate in the current empirical application, since some of the independent variables are measured in different units. Table 3 shows that when standardised coefficients are considered ( $e^{bStdX}$ ), the ordering of the effects changes only slightly. In Model 8, the natural variable standardised coefficient is 3.89, for remoteness it is 1.76, for RGDP it is 1.65, for K/L differences 0.75, and for real GDP differences 0.74. For one standard deviation increase in “natural”, the odds are 3.89 times greater (an increase of 289%) of countries being in a higher integration category, when all other variables are held constant.

*Table 3. Odds ratios for the ordered logit.*

In order to evaluate the probability that the dependent variable will have a particular value, we use cut-offs terms. From equation (1) the threshold parameters for Model 8 are given by:

$$Y_i = 0 \text{ if } Y^*_i = -3.41$$

$$Y_i = 1 \text{ if } -3.41 = Y^*_i = -2.71$$

$$Y_i = 2 \text{ if } -2.71 = Y^*_i = -1.8$$

$$Y_i = 3 \text{ if } -1.8 = Y^*_i = -1.58$$

$$Y_i = 4 \text{ if } -1.58 = Y^*_i = 0.38$$

$$Y_i = 5 \text{ if } Y^*_i = 0.38$$

For example, when the trading partners are Argentina and Paraguay, we can calculate the probability associated with this pair of countries by computing  $Z_i$  with the obtained coefficients in Model 8 and the correspondent data:

$$\begin{aligned} Z_i &= b_1 \cdot RGDP_{ij} + b_2 \cdot DRGDP_{ij} + b_3 \cdot DKL_{ij} + b_4 \cdot REMOTE + b_5 \cdot NATURAL = \\ &= (0.18 \cdot 46.7) + (-0.17 \cdot 4.22) + (-0.26 \cdot 3.3) + (1.49 \cdot (-6.94)) + (0.31 \cdot 3.98) = -2.28 \end{aligned}$$

$$\Pr(Y = 0) = \Pr(Z_i \leq 0) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-2.28 - (-3.41))} = 0.2442$$

$$\Pr(Y = 1) = \Pr(Z_i \leq d_1) - \Pr(Z_i \leq 0) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-2.28 - (-2.71))} - \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-2.28 - (3.41))} = 0.1499$$

$$\Pr(Y = 2) = \Pr(Z_i \leq d_2) - \Pr(Z_i \leq d_1) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-2.28 - (-1.8))} - \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-2.28 - (-2.71))} = 0.2236$$

$$\Pr(Y = 3) = \Pr(Z_i \leq d_3) - \Pr(Z_i \leq d_2) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-2.28 - (-1.58))} - \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-2.28 - (-1.8))} = 0.0505$$

$$\Pr(Y = 4) = \Pr(Z_i \leq d_4) - \Pr(Z_i \leq d_3) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-2.28 - (0.38))} - \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-2.28 - (-1.58))} = 0.2664$$

$$\Pr(Y = 5) = \Pr(d_5 \leq Z_i) = 1 - \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-2.28 - (0.38))} = 0.0654$$

Hence, for Argentina and Paraguay the most likely outcome is that they will form a single market. In fact, they have been members of Mercosur since 1995.

Our second example is Spain and France, a pair of trading partners that are members of the European Union. Our results indicate that the highest probability is that of the establishment of a single market. In 1999 these countries were already in the third phase of the European Monetary Union (EMU), since they fulfilled the convergence criteria established in the Treaty of Maastricht. However, our results most probably show that they were only in the EMU starting phase.

$$\begin{aligned} Z_i &= \mathbf{b}_1 \cdot \mathbf{RGDPij} + \mathbf{b}_2 \cdot \mathbf{DRGDPij} + \mathbf{b}_3 \cdot \mathbf{DKLij} + \mathbf{b}_4 \cdot \mathbf{REMOTE} + \mathbf{b}_5 \cdot \mathbf{NATURAL} \\ &= (0.18 \cdot 52.6) + (-0.17 \cdot 1.24) + (-0.26 \cdot 0.732) + (1.49 \cdot (-6.96)) + (0.31 \cdot 3.75) = -0.14 \end{aligned}$$

$$\Pr(Y = 0) = \Pr(Z_i \leq 0) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-0.14 - (-3.41))} = 0.0366$$

$$\Pr(Y = 1) = \Pr(Z_i \leq \mathbf{d}_1) - \Pr(Z_i \leq 0) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-0.14 - (-2.71))} - \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-0.14 - (-3.41))} = 0.0345$$

$$\Pr(Y = 2) = \Pr(Z_i \leq \mathbf{d}_2) - \Pr(Z_i \leq \mathbf{d}_1) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-0.14 - (-1.8))} - \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-0.14 - (-2.71))} = 0.0887$$

$$\Pr(Y = 3) = \Pr(Z_i \leq \mathbf{d}_3) - \Pr(Z_i \leq \mathbf{d}_2) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-0.14 - (-1.58))} - \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-0.14 - (-1.8))} = 0.0318$$

$$\Pr(Y = 4) = \Pr(Z_i \leq \mathbf{d}_4) - \Pr(Z_i \leq \mathbf{d}_3) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-0.14 - (0.38))} - \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-0.14 - (-1.58))} = 0.4356$$

$$\Pr(Y = 5) = \Pr(\mathbf{d}_5 \leq Z_i) = 1 - \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-0.14 - (0.38))} = 0.3728$$

The calculation of the predicted probabilities for all the trading partners shows that 69% of the agreements and 84% of the non-agreements were correctly predicted by the ordered logit model. Of all cases, 17% had excessive bilateralism<sup>7</sup>, i.e., when the predicted level of integration was lower than the real level, and we found that bilateralism was insufficient for 6.5% of the trading partners.

#### 4.3 Marginal effects

As BB point out, “one complication arises in estimating the partial effects on the response probabilities for the particular vector of RHS variables,  $x$ , in our model by using mean values for the levels. One of the RHS variables, REMOTE, is the product of a continuous variable and a binary variable (...) the mean value of this variable is economically meaningless”.<sup>8</sup>

As we also use REMOTE, we estimate separately the marginal effects on the response probabilities with the mean value of REMOTE when the trading partners are in the

<sup>7</sup> “Excessive” and “insufficient” bilateralism are terms used by BB.

<sup>8</sup> Baier and Bergstrand (2004), page 55.

same continent, and when REMOTE takes the value of zero (the trading partners are not in the same continent, they are unnatural partners).

Marginal effects are calculated for Model 5 (probit) and Model 8 (ordered logit). Our results for the probit estimation are shown in Table 4 and for the ordered logit estimation in Table 5. Our results in Table 4 can be compared with those obtained by BB, shown in Appendix B (Tables B.1 and B.2).

*Table 4. Response probabilities for natural and unnatural trading partners in Model 5 (evaluated at the mean level of remote and at remote = 0).*

Table 4 shows that the response probability of an RIA being created is much lower for unnatural partners (7.94%) than for natural partners (88.05%). Moreover, results show that a unitary increase in proximity (natural variable) increases this probability by 7.03% for two natural partners and 14.86% for unnatural partners. An increase in remoteness from the rest of the world of two natural partners lessens the response probability in natural partners. Although this is an unexpected result, Table 5 shows that the sign of this marginal effect changes for different levels of integration when the model estimated is an ordered logit rather than a binary probit model. This sign is only positive for the first two integration stages (PTA and FTA). When two countries are in the same continent and they are relatively far away from the other countries in this continent, then the probability that they will reach a customs union decreases with the level of remoteness.

Results also show that economic variables have a lower effect than geographical factors on response probabilities, although differences in income also play an important role in RIA creation.

The response probability for natural partners is similar to that obtained by BB, who find 86.7% probability of a FTA being established between natural partners. However, they only obtain a probability of 1.2% for unnatural partners. We obtain a higher probability for unnatural partners because we also considered preferential trade agreements in the construction of the dependent variable.

To compare the effect of the RHS variables across different levels of integration, in Table 5 we estimate the marginal effects for all the integration levels for both natural and unnatural partners.

*Table 5. Response probabilities for natural and unnatural trading partners in Model 8 (evaluated at the mean level of remote and at remote = 0).*

Table 5 shows different probabilities depending on the level of integration. For each level of integration, the probabilities are shown for natural and for unnatural partners. However, for the three last categories (customs union, single market and monetary union) the probabilities can only be calculated for natural partners, since these integration levels are only reached by countries in the same continent. These probabilities depend mainly on geographical and economic variables, and their marginal effects differ across integration levels.

On the one hand, the results obtained for natural partners (countries in the same continent) indicate that when remoteness increases by 1%, the probability of a PTA or an FTA being established increases by 199% and 57% respectively. However, the probability of a customs union or a higher integration agreement being established decreases with remoteness. This variable, together with real GDP, is the most influential factor on the probability of an RIA being formed or enhanced between natural partners.

Higher GDP differences increase the probability of PTA or FTA formation for natural partners, although for higher levels of integration, the sign of the marginal effect is reversed, thus indicating that similarity of income, as expected, increases the probability that higher levels of integration (customs union, single market and monetary union) will be reached. Integration theory predicts that the costs of integration are lower when the countries have similar income levels and consequently, a high level of intra-industry trade.

On the other hand, for unnatural partners (countries in a different continent) the inverse of distance is the most important factor in PTA or FTA formation and higher differences in income and in factor endowments lower the probability of a PTA or an FTA being established.

According to our results, the most likely outcomes are that natural partners will establish a single market and unnatural partners will not establish any agreement.

#### *4.3 Sensitivity Analysis*

We performed several robustness tests to validate our results. First, the ordered logit model is based on the assumption of parallel slopes but this may be unrealistic, for example if geographical variables are less relevant for higher integration levels. Therefore, the brant test of the parallel regression assumption is used to validate the methodology used. The Brant (1990) test assesses whether or not the coefficients are the same for each category of the dependent variable. This produces Wald Tests for the null hypothesis that the coefficients in each independent variable are constant across categories of the dependent variable. Significant test statistics provide evidence that this assumption has been violated for most of the variables. With the exception of the capital-labour ratio, we cannot accept the equality of slopes for the different levels of integration (Table A.4). These results indicate that we should estimate a generalised

logit model, and they suggest what variables may be used in determining the thresholds. We therefore estimated a generalised ordered logit for all the regressions presented in Table 2. In some cases, the model did not converge, especially when the variables with missing data (K-L differences) were included. The results<sup>9</sup> indicate that the geographical variables are significant and show the expected signs for the lower levels of integration (PTA, FTA), whereas for the higher levels these variables lose significance and decrease in magnitude. In contrast, the economic and political variables gain importance in the higher levels of integration.

Secondly, we re-estimated the probit and ordered logit model with an alternative data set taken from Magee (2003), which are available for replications on the website. His dependent variable takes the value of one if the country pair has a PTA in 1998 and zero otherwise. We use the same dependent variable in the probit estimation, but Magee (2003) considers fewer agreements since they ignore the General System of Trade Preferences (GSTP), the Protocol related to Trade Negotiations among developing countries (PTN) and the African Common Market. Additionally, the variable remoteness is not included as explanatory variable in Magee (2003). We estimate a binary probit for 172 countries in 1998 and our results confirm the sign and significance of the estimated coefficients for the income variables, the relative factor endowment differences and the natural variable (Model 7.1 in Table 1). Contrary to BB, the K-L differences variable is negative and significant, thus validating our evidence. Similar results are obtained when an ordered logit is estimated.

Thirdly, we also estimated the probit model with the inclusion of bilateral trade as an explanatory variable and using instrumental variables to correct for endogeneity problems. Infrastructure variables were used as instruments for trade. The results

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<sup>9</sup> Results are not shown for reasons of space, but are available from the authors upon request.

indicate that trade is significant and has a positive sign when it is added to the list of explanatory variables in the probit model, confirming the evidence presented by Magee (2003) with different data and different model specifications. However, as stated above further research is needed to solve problems related to the high correlation among the independent variables and to improve the model specification.

Finally, the ordered nature of the dependent variable and the endogeneity of trade flows should ideally be considered simultaneously, but this is beyond the scope of this research.

## **5. Conclusions**

In this paper, discrete choice modelling is used to study the determinants of regional trade agreements. A binary probit model and an ordered logit model are estimated, in which geographical, economic and socio-political variables are considered as explanatory variables for RIA formation. Five different integration levels are specified for the dependent variable in the ordered logit estimation.

The results from the probit and ordered logit estimations show that the probability of reaching a higher level of integration increases with income level, economic freedom, cultural affinities and remoteness, whereas it decreases with distance, protection levels, income differences and factor endowment differences. Additionally, geographical variables seem to be the most important determinants of RIA formation.

The marginal effects, calculated for natural and unnatural trading partners, show that countries in the same continent (natural partners) will most probably establish a single market, whereas countries in different continents (unnatural partners) are most likely not to sign any agreement. This result is new in the RIA literature and should be validated by extending the sample to include more years and countries. The marginal effects also show that some variables, such as remoteness and differences in real GDP, have a

positive influence on the formation of an RIA, but only for countries in the same continent and in the early stages of the integration process (PTA, FTA). However, when the categories considered are higher integration levels, the effect of these two variables is reversed.

The estimation of a trade equation that considers the formation of RIAs as an endogenously determined explanatory variable remains an issue for further research. The extension of the sample to include more years would enable dynamic issues to be analysed.

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Table 1. Probit results for the probability of RIA formation or enhancement

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 7.1 <sup>a</sup>
Constant	4.07*** (17.31)	2.07*** (6.34)	2.31*** (3.42)	1.63** (2.41)	2.35* (1.88)	2.32* (1.87)	2.34* (1.88)	-0.78 (-1.03)
NATURAL	0.56*** (20.3)	0.35*** (9.55)	0.56*** (11.37)	0.54*** (10.64)	0.85*** (8.51)	0.85*** (8.53)	0.86*** (8.51)	1.19*** (32.63)
REMOTE	-	0.16*** (9.35)	0.14*** (6.65)	0.14*** (6.64)	0.16*** (4.40)	0.16*** (4.44)	0.16*** (4.32)	-
RGDP	-	-	0.04*** (3.81)	0.06*** (5.75)	0.09*** (6.4)	0.09*** (6.47)	0.09*** (6.44)	0.11*** (13.87)
DRGDP	-	-	-	-0.16*** (-9.47)	-0.15*** (-5.75)	-0.15*** (-5.83)	-0.15*** (-5.71)	-0.065*** (-3.47)
DKL	-	-	-	-	-0.09** (-2.12)	-0.16 (-1.38)	-	-0.17*** (-6.99)
SQDKL	-	-	-	-	-	0.02 (0.62)	-0.02* (-1.71)	-
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.1226	0.1418	0.4536	0.4696	0.7797	0.7798	0.7794	0.865
McFadden's R <sup>2</sup>	0.1226	0.1418	0.2087	0.2319	0.4289	0.429	0.4282	0.462
Log Likelihood	-2014.167	-1969.952	-1254.244	-1217.419	-505.633	-505.485	-506.251	-1304
Number of observations	4160	4160	2756	2756	1482	1482	1482	9045

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Z-statistics are in brackets. The dependent variable is a binary discrete variable that takes the value of 1 when trading partners were integrated in a PTA, FTA, customs union, single market and monetary union in 1999, and 0 otherwise. The Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance is used in place of the traditional calculation, therefore the estimation uses heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors.<sup>a</sup> Model 7.1 was estimated with an alternative data set for a cross-section of 172 countries in 1998 from Magee (2003).

Table 2. Ordered logit results for the probability of RIA formation or enhancement.

	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
<b><i>Economic variables</i></b>					
RGDP	0.18*** (6.89)	0.09*** (4.10)	-	-	-
DRGDP	-0.17*** (-3.77)	-0.31*** (-7.64)	-	-	-
DKL	-0.26*** (-3.34)	-0.44*** (-5.36)	-	-	-
Trade barriers	-	-0.59*** (-4.23)	-	-	-
<b><i>Geographical variables</i></b>					
NATURAL	1.49*** (10.95)	-	0.84*** (12.83)	0.83*** (12.54)	-
REMOTE	0.31*** (6.28)	-	0.24*** (9.35)	0.23*** (8.22)	-
Adjacency dummy	-	-	0.49*** (2.87)	0.47*** (2.79)	-
Landlocked dummy	-	-	-0.63*** (-5.92)	-0.94*** (-5.46)	-
Interaction variable (Landlocked*remote)				0.14*** (2.36)	
<b><i>Socio-political variables</i></b>					
Language dummy	-	-	-	-	0.35*** (3.62)
Democracy dummy	-	-	-	-	0.18*** (2.25)
Economic freedom	-	-	-	-	-0.36*** (-3.21)
Cut 1	-3.41	1.78	-5.87	-5.79	0.61
Cut 2	-2.71	2.21	-4.9	-4.82	1.34
Cut 3	-1.8	2.56	-4.18	-4.11	1.91
Cut 4	-1.58	2.69	-3.86	-3.78	2.17
Cut 5	0.38	4.07	-2.64	-2.57	3.25
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.7168	0.6559	0.1297	0.1306	0.0412
McFadden's R <sup>2</sup>	0.3112	0.0824	0.1297	0.1306	0.0041
Log likelihood	-1040.835	-1264.454	-3198.631	-3195.6041	-3548.7573
Exp (log likelihood / observations)	0.4954	0.3871	0.4635	0.4646	0.4137
Akaike Info Criterion (AIC)	1.418	1.914	1.542	1.539	1.762
Number of observations	1482	1332	4160	4160	4032

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Z-statistics are in brackets. The dependent variable is a discrete variable that takes the value of 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 when trading partners were integrated respectively in a PTA, FTA, customs union, single market and monetary union in 1999, and 0 otherwise. The Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance is used in place of the traditional calculation, therefore the estimation uses heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Bilateral trade, exporter's and importer's trade barriers and economic freedom are in natural logarithms.

Table 3. Odds ratios for the ordered logit.

		Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
<b>Economic variables</b>						
RGDP	coef	0.18***	0.09***	-	-	-
	e <sup>b</sup>	1.19	1.1	-	-	-
	e <sup>b</sup> StdX	1.65	1.31	-	-	-
DRGDP	coef	-0.17***	-0.31***	-	-	-
	e <sup>b</sup>	0.84	0.73	-	-	-
	e <sup>b</sup> StdX	0.74	0.59	-	-	-
DKL	coef	-0.26***	-0.44***	-	-	-
	e <sup>b</sup>	0.77	0.64	-	-	-
	e <sup>b</sup> StdX	0.75	0.62	-	-	-
Trade barriers	coef	-	-0.59***	-	-	-
	e <sup>b</sup>	-	0.55	-	-	-
	e <sup>b</sup> StdX	-	0.64	-	-	-
<b>Geographical variables</b>						
NATURAL	coef	1.49***	-	0.84***	-	-
	e <sup>b</sup>	4.46	-	2.33	2.30	-
	e <sup>b</sup> StdX	3.89	-	2.10	2.08	-
REMOTE	coef	0.31***	-	0.24***	-	-
	e <sup>b</sup>	1.37	-	1.28	1.25	-
	e <sup>b</sup> StdX	1.76	-	1.51	1.47	-
Adjacency dummy	coef	-	-	0.49***	-	-
	e <sup>b</sup>	-	-	1.63	1.60	-
	e <sup>b</sup> StdX	-	-	1.09	1.09	-
Landlocked dummy	coef	-	-	-0.63***	0.14***	-
	e <sup>b</sup>	-	-	0.53	0.39	-
	e <sup>b</sup> StdX	-	-	0.77	0.68	-
Interaction variable (landlocked*remote)	coef	-	-	-	0.14***	-
	e <sup>b</sup>	-	-	-	1.15	-
	e <sup>b</sup> StdX	-	-	-	1.14	-
<b>Socio-political variables</b>						
Language dummy	coef	-	-	-	-	0.35***
	e <sup>b</sup>	-	-	-	-	1.41
	e <sup>b</sup> StdX	-	-	-	-	1.13
Democracy dummy	coef	-	-	-	-	0.18***
	e <sup>b</sup>	-	-	-	-	1.19
	e <sup>b</sup> StdX	-	-	-	-	1.09
Economic freedom	coef	-	-	-	-	-0.36***
	e <sup>b</sup>	-	-	-	-	0.70
	e <sup>b</sup> StdX	-	-	-	-	0.88

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Odd ratios are e<sup>b</sup> and e<sup>b</sup>stdX. e<sup>b</sup> = exp(b) = factor change in odds for unit increase in X; e<sup>b</sup>stdX = exp(b\*SD of X) = change in odds for SD increase in X. The dependent variable is a discrete variable that takes the value of 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 when trading partners were integrated respectively in a PTA, FTA, customs union, single market and monetary union in 1999, and 0 otherwise. The Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance is used in place of the traditional calculation, therefore the estimation uses heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. Exporter's and importer's trade barriers and economic freedom are in natural logarithms.

Table 4. Response probabilities for natural and unnatural trading partners in Model 5  
(evaluated at the mean level of remote and at remote = 0).

Variable	$Y_i = \Pr(\text{RIA} = 1 \mid \text{natural partners}) = 0.8805$			
	dYi/dx	z-statistics	95% confidence interval	
NATURAL	0.0703**	2.46	0.0144	0.1263
REMOTE	-1.5116***	-5.52	-2.0483	-0.9748
RGDP	0.0494***	7.28	0.0361	0.0627
DRGDP	-0.0728***	-6.7	-0.0941	-0.0515
DKL	0.0155	0.88	-0.0189	0.0499
Variable	$Y_i = \Pr(\text{RIA} = 1 \mid \text{unnatural partners}) = 0.0794$			
	dYi/dx	z-statistics	95% confidence interval	
NATURAL	0.1486***	8.31	0.1136	0.1837
RGDP	-0.0033	-1.39	-0.008	0.0014
DRGDP	-0.0164***	-3.17	-0.0265	-0.0062
DKL	-0.0231***	-3.03	-0.0381	-0.0082

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

Table 5. Response probabilities for natural and unnatural trading partners in Model 8  
(evaluated at the mean level of remote and at remote = 0).

Variable	Yi = Pr (RIA = Preferential Trade Agreement   natural partners) = 0.1913			
	dYi/dx	z-statistics	95% confidence interval	
NATURAL	-0.0093	-0.49	-0.0467	0.0281
REMOTE	1.9932***	7.1	1.4431	2.5434
RGDP	-0.0151***	-3.3	-0.024	-0.0061
DRGDP	0.0267***	3.9	0.0133	0.0402
DKL	0.0225	1.43	-0.0084	0.0534
Variable	Yi = Pr (RIA= Preferential Trade Agreement  unnatural partners) = 0.0367			
	dYi/dx	z-statistics	95% confidence interval	
NATURAL	0.0913***	8.45	0.0701	0.1125
RGDP	-0.0016	-1.57	-0.0035	0.0004
DRGDP	-0.0059**	-2.41	-0.0109	-0.0011
DKL	-0.0151***	-4.33	-0.0219	-0.0083
Variable	Yi = Pr (RIA = Free Trade Agreement   natural partners) = 0.1832			
	dYi/dx	z-statistics	95% confidence interval	
NATURAL	-0.0027	-0.45	-0.0142	0.0088
REMOTE	0.5727***	2.97	0.1942	0.9513
RGDP	-0.0043**	-2.37	-0.0079	-0.0007
DRGDP	0.0077**	2.51	0.0017	0.0137
DKL	0.0065	1.39	-0.0027	0.0156
Variable	Yi = Pr (RIA = Free Trade Agreement   unnatural partners) = 0.0301			
	dYi/dx	z-statistics	95% confidence interval	
NATURAL	0.0804***	9.49	0.0638	0.0971
RGDP	-0.0014	-1.62	-0.0031	0.0003
DRGDP	-0.0053***	-2.75	-0.0091	-0.0015
DKL	-0.0133***	-4.38	-0.0192	-0.0073
Variable	Yi = Pr (RIA = Customs Union   natural partners) = 0.0991			
	dYi/dx	z-statistics	95% confidence interval	
NATURAL	0.0011	0.52	-0.0029	0.0052
REMOTE	-0.2349*	-1.88	-0.4799	0.0101
RGDP	0.0018*	1.82	-0.0001	0.0037
DRGDP	-0.0031*	-1.77	-0.0066	0.0003
DKL	-0.0026	-0.97	-0.008	0.0027
Variable	Yi = Pr (RIA = Single Market   natural partners) = 0.3456			
	dYi/dx	z-statistics	95% confidence interval	
NATURAL	0.0178	0.49	-0.0538	0.0894
REMOTE	-3.8125***	-10.53	-4.5219	-3.103
RGDP	0.0288***	3.6	0.0131	0.0445
DRGDP	-0.0512***	-4.44	-0.0738	-0.0286
DKL	-0.0431	-1.45	-0.1011	0.015
Variable	Yi = Pr (RIA = Monetary Union   natural partners) = 0.0439			
	dYi/dx	z-statistics	95% confidence interval	
NATURAL	0.0038	0.48	-0.0117	0.0193
REMOTE	-0.8184***	-7.14	-1.0431	-0.5937
RGDP	0.0062***	3.47	0.0027	0.0097
DRGDP	-0.0109***	-4.22	-0.0161	-0.0059
DKL	-0.0092	-1.51	-0.0212	0.0027

Notes: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

## APPENDIX A

Table A.1. 66 country-sample.

South Africa	France	Peru
Algeria	Germany	Pakistan
Argentina	Ghana	Poland
Australia	Greece	Portugal
Austria	Hong Kong	Paraguay
Belgium-Luxembourg	Honduras	Czech Republic
Bolivia	Iceland	El Salvador
Brazil	India	Senegal
Bulgaria	Ireland	Singapore
Canada	Israel	Spain
Chile	Italy	Sudan
China	Jamaica	Sweden
Colombia	Japan	Syrian Arab Republic
Costa Rica	Kenya	Switzerland
Croatia	Korea South	Tanzania
Cyprus	Mexico	Trinidad Tobago
Denmark	Mozambique	Turkey
Dominican Republic	Netherlands	UK
Ecuador	Nicaragua	Uruguay
Egypt	Norway	USA
Slovakia	Nepal	Venezuela
Finland	Panama	




Table A.2. Variable descriptions and data sources.

Variable	Description	Source
<i>Fta99</i> : RIAs	Discrete variable that takes the value 0 when there is no agreement between trading partners, 1 when there is a preferential trade agreement, 2 when there is a free trade agreement, 3 when there is a customs union, 4 when there is a single market and 5 when there is a monetary union	World Trade Organisation (1995, 2005)
<i>NATURAL</i> : Natural trading partners (inverse of distance)	Log of the inverse of the great circle distances between trading partner country capitals (km)	Great circle distances between cities (2003) Authors' calculations
<i>REMOTE</i> : Remoteness	Relative distance of a pair of continental trading partners from the rest of the world	Baier and Bergstrand (2004) Authors' calculations
<i>RGDPij</i> : Exporter's and importer's income	Measures the sum of the logs of real GDPs of the exporter and the importer country in 1960 (constant 1995 US\$)	World Bank (2001)
<i>DRGDPij</i>	Absolute value of the difference between the logs of real GDPs in the exporter and the importer countries in 1960 (constant 1995 US\$)	World Bank (2001)
<i>DKLij</i>	Absolute value of the difference between capital stock per worker in the exporter and the importer countries in 1965 (1985 international prices)	Penn World Tables (2005) Authors' calculations
<i>SQDKLij</i>	<i>Squared DKLij</i>	Penn World Tables (2005) Authors' calculations
<i>Adjij</i> : Adjacency dummy	Dummy variable = 1 if the trading partners share a border, 0 otherwise	CIA (2003)
<i>Landij</i> : Landlocked dummy	Dummy variable = 1 if the country is landlocked, 0 otherwise	CIA (2003)
<i>Langij</i> : Language dummy	Dummy variable = 1 if the trading partners share the same official language, 0 otherwise.	CIA (2003)
<i>Freeij</i> : countries economic freedom	Index of Economic Freedom	Miles et al. (2004)
<i>Demij</i> : Democracy dummy	Dummy variable = 1 if the exporter, the importer or both have a democracy, 0 otherwise.	The Freedom House
<i>Xij</i> : Exports from i to j	Nominal value of bilateral exports	Statistics Canada (2001)
<i>Tij</i> : Countries tariff barriers	Average tariff rates unweighted in %	World Bank (2005)

Note: CIA denotes Central Intelligence Agency.

*Table A.3. Trade Agreements (in chronological order of date of entry into force)*

	<b>Date</b>	<b>Type of agreement and related provisions</b>
Salvador-Nicaragua FTA	1951	Free Trade Agreement (GATT Art. XXIV)
EC (Treaty of Rome)	1958	Customs Union (GATT Art. XXIV)
EFTA (Stockholm Convention)	1960	Free Trade Agreement (GATT Art. XXIV)
LAFTA (Latin American FTA)	1961-1979	Free Trade Agreement (GATT Art. XXIV)
CAFTA (Central American FTA)	1961-1975	Free Trade Agreement (GATT Art. XXIV)
FINEFTA	1961	Interim agreement for the formation of a FTA (GATT Art. XXIV)
African Common Market	1963	Customs Union (GATT Art. XXIV)
Arab Common Market	1965	Interim agreement for the formation of a FTA leading to a customs union (GATT Art. XXIV)
Ireland-United Kingdom FTA	1966	Free Trade Agreement (GATT Art. XXIV)
Trade Expansion and Cooperation Agreement (TRIPARTITE)	1968	Preferential Arrangement (Enabling Clause)
EFTA-FINEFTA accession of Iceland	1970	Free Trade Agreement (GATT Art. XXIV)
Protocol relating to Trade Negotiations among developing countries (PTN)	1973	Preferential Arrangement (Enabling Clause)
EC-Accession of Denmark, Ireland and United Kingdom	1973	Customs Union (GATT Art. XXIV)
EC-EFTA Free Trade Agreement	1973	Free Trade Agreement (GATT Art. XXIV)
CARICOM (Caribbean Community and Common Market)	1973	Customs Union (GATT Art. XXIV)
Bulgaria-Finland FTA	1975	Free Trade Agreement (GATT Art. XXIV)
Bangkok Agreement	1976	Preferential Arrangement (Enabling Clause)
PTA for Eastern and Southern African States	1981	Preferential Arrangement (Enabling Clause)
LAIA (Latin American Integration Association)	1981	Preferential Arrangement (Enabling Clause)
EC- Accession of Greece	1981	Customs Union (GATT Art. XXIV)
Israel-United States FTA	1985	Free Trade Agreement (GATT Art. XXIV)
ECO (Economic Cooperation Organisation)	1985	Preferential Arrangement (Enabling Clause)
EC- Accession of Portugal and Spain	1986	Customs Union (GATT Art. XXIV)
CUFTA (Canada-United States FTA)	1988	Free Trade Agreement (GATT Art. XXIV)
Andean Group (CAN)	1988	Preferential Arrangement (Enabling Clause)
General System of Trade Preferences among developing countries (GSTP)	1989	Preferential Arrangement (Enabling Clause)
MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market)	1991	Customs Union (Enabling Clause)
EFTA-Turkey FTA	1992	Free Trade Agreement (GATT Art. XXIV)
Cross Border Initiative	1992	Common Policy Framework---PTA
EFTA-Czech and Slovak Republic FTA	1992	Interim agreement for the formation of a FTA (GATT Art. XXIV)
CACM (Central American Common Market)	1993	Customs Union (GATT Art. XXIV)
EFTA-Israel FTA	1993	Free Trade Agreement (GATT Art. XXIV)
EFTA-Poland FTA	1993	Interim agreement for the formation of a FTA
Czech Republic-Slovak Republic Customs Union Agreement	1993	Customs Union (GATT Art. XXIV)
CEFTA (Central Europe FTA)	1993	Free Trade Agreement (GATT Art. XXIV)
EFTA-Bulgaria FTA	1993	Free Trade Agreement (GATT Art. XXIV)
Single Market EU	1993	Single Market
EU-Bulgaria FTA	1994	Free Trade Agreement (GATT Art. XXIV)
EU-EFTA EEA (European Economic Area)	1994	Single Market
NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement)	1994	Free Trade Agreement (GATT Art. XXIV)
EU (Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden)	1995	Single Market (GATT Art. XXIV)
Andean Group (CAN)	1995	Customs Union (Enabling Clause)
EU-Israel agreement	1995	Agreement on the implementation of a FTA
MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market)	1995	Single Market (Enabling Clause)
SAPTA (South Asian Preferential Trade Arrangement)	1995	Preferential Arrangement (Enabling Clause)
EU-Turkey	1996	Customs Union (GATT Art. XXIV)
Canada-Chile	1997	Free Trade Agreement (GATT Art. XXIV)

Canada-Israel	1997	Free Trade Agreement (GATT Art. XXIV)
Israel-Turkey	1997	Free Trade Agreement (GATT Art. XXIV)
CEFTA- Accession of Bulgaria	1998	Free Trade Agreement (GATT Art. XXIV)
European Monetary Union (11 members)	1999	Monetary Union
Chile-Mexico	1999	Free Trade Agreement (GATT Art. XXIV)
Bulgaria-Turkey	1999	Free Trade Agreement (GATT Art. XXIV)

Sources:

WTO (2005), Regional Trade Agreements Notified to the GATT/WTO and in force

WTO (1995)

Baier and Bergstrand (2005)

*Table A.4. Brant Test of Parallel Regression*

Variable	chi2	p>chi2	df
All	-336.22	1.000	20
RGDP	18.53	0.001	4
DRGDP	10.44	0.034	4
DKL	8.55	0.073	4
NATURAL	381.42	0.000	4
REMOTE	155.06	0.000	4

Note: A significant test statistic provides evidence that the parallel regression assumption has been violated.

## APPENDIX B

Table B.1. Probit results for the probability of an FTA.

Variable:	Specification						
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Constant	13.42 <sup>a</sup> (20.29)	9.76 <sup>a</sup> (12.46)	4.31 <sup>a</sup> (3.48)	3.49 <sup>a</sup> (2.72)	4.22 <sup>a</sup> (3.05)	4.22 <sup>a</sup> (3.05)	7.90 <sup>a</sup> (4.92)
NATURAL	1.74 <sup>a</sup> (21.21)	1.36 <sup>a</sup> (14.29)	1.49 <sup>a</sup> (13.97)	1.52 <sup>a</sup> (13.74)	1.64 <sup>a</sup> (13.59)	1.65 <sup>a</sup> (13.59)	1.76 <sup>a</sup> (13.43)
REMOTE		0.15 <sup>a</sup> (10.37)	0.15 <sup>a</sup> (9.86)	0.16 <sup>a</sup> (9.98)	0.17 <sup>a</sup> (10.28)	0.17 <sup>a</sup> (10.24)	0.18 <sup>a</sup> (10.03)
RGDP			0.19 <sup>a</sup> (5.33)	0.23 <sup>a</sup> (5.94)	0.22 <sup>a</sup> (5.28)	0.22 <sup>a</sup> (5.27)	0.17 <sup>a</sup> (3.67)
DRGDP				0.25 <sup>a</sup> (-4.29)	0.27 <sup>a</sup> (-4.68)	0.28 <sup>a</sup> (-4.69)	0.34 <sup>a</sup> (-5.45)
DKL					0.43 <sup>a</sup> (5.42)	0.49 <sup>b</sup> (2.10)	0.85 <sup>a</sup> (7.37)
SQDKL						-0.02 (-0.27)	
DROWKL							-1.29 <sup>a</sup> (-5.53)
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.571	0.647	0.668	0.683	0.704	0.704	0.728
Log likelihood	-306.9	-252.5	-237.4	-227.1	-211.7	-211.7	-194.4
Number of observations	1431	1431	1431	1431	1431	1431	1431

Source: Baier and Bergstrand (2004)

Table B.2. Response probabilities to a one S.D. (s) change in RHS<sup>10</sup> variables for natural and unnatural trading partners.

Variable	$P(\text{FTA}=1   \text{natural partners})=0.867$	
	$-\sigma$	$+\sigma$
NATURAL	0.384 (0.302, 0.472)	0.994 (0.984, 0.998)
REMOTE	0.859 (0.804, 0.903)	0.873 (0.814, 0.911)
RGDP	0.780 (0.693, 0.850)	0.926 (0.873, 0.961)
DRGDP	0.938 (0.895, 0.966)	0.751 (0.663, 0.825)
DKL	0.663 (0.568, 0.749)	0.964 (0.930, 0.983)
DROWKL	0.952 (0.909, 0.977)	0.712 (0.615, 0.796)
Variable	$P(\text{FTA}=1   \text{unnatural partners})=0.012$	
	$-\sigma$	$+\sigma$
NATURAL	0.000014 (0.000001, 0.00010)	0.086 (0.057, 0.126)
RGDP	0.005 (0.002, 0.012)	0.028 (0.015, 0.050)
DRGDP	0.071 (0.045, 0.107)	0.010 (0.004, 0.022)
DKL	0.0009 (0.0002, 0.0033)	0.041 (0.023, 0.069)
DROWKL	0.013 (0.006, 0.028)	0.0007 (0.0002, 0.0024)

Source: Baier and Bergstrand (2004)

<sup>10</sup> RHS denotes right hand side variables.

